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Abstract 
Most organizations are aware that threats from trusted insiders pose a great risk to 
their organization and are difficult to protect against. Auditing is recognized as an 
effective technique for detecting malicious activity. However, current auditing methods 
are typically applied with a one-size-fits-all approach and may not be an appropriate 
mitigation strategy for the insider threat. 
This research develops a 4-step methodology for designing a customized auditing 
template for a Microsoft Windows XP® operating system. Two tailoring methods are 
presented which evaluate both by category and and by configuration. Also developed are 
various metrics and weighting factors as a mechanism to evaluate auditing effectiveness 
for the purpose of optimizing the template according to organizational security 
requirements. Various industry standard auditing templates are evaluated against a 
custom designed template. Results indicate that a customized auditing template tailored 
for an insider threat scenario is more effective at detecting insider malicious activities. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF A METHODOLOGY FOR CUSTOMIZING INSIDER 
THREAT AUDITING ON A MICROSOFT WINDOWS XP® PROFESSIONAL 
OPERATING SYSTEM 
 
 
1. I. Introduction 
This research introduces a methodology for developing a customized auditing 
template for a computer workstation.  The methodology is designed to tailor the auditing 
settings for a workstation using the Microsoft Windows XP® Operating System according 
to the unique organizational security requirements in regards to an insider threat. 
1.1. Research Motivation 
Information has always been a critical resource and key ingredient for decision-
making abilities. The rapid growth of microcomputers and distributed networks has 
significantly increased the amount of information available to decision makers in 
electronic form. One drawback of the availability of widespread information in electronic 
form has been the inherent complications of protecting that information. The protection 
of information is an extremely critical area of study.   
Threats to an organization’s information resources can be classified in three 
categories: (1) outside threats, (2) inside threats, and (3) natural threats. Most 
organizations are aware of threats to their information resources and do what they can to 
protect them. Natural threats such as natural disasters and power losses are generally 
relatively simple to understand and require planning and procedures to mitigate, such as 
backup strategies. Outsider threats are more complicated and are commonly countered 
with technological solutions such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems, and antivirus 
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software. The threat from trusted insiders can be significant to an organization, and 
significantly more difficult to mitigate. One approach to deal with the insider threat is to 
implement measures to detect the malicious actions that they perform. One technique to 
accomplish this is by auditing their actions. If this auditing is properly performed, then 
insider activities that stray from the norm can be recognized and investigated. One 
resource available to accomplish this is by invoking the auditing capabilities available in 
Microsoft Windows XP®. The Windows XP® Operating System provides a wide variety 
of auditing capabilities which can be used to detect potential malicious insider activities. 
Although these auditing capabilities exist, they are not enabled by default. An 
organization needs to configure client workstations to audit events based on its identified 
security requirements. Determining the events to audit is a difficult process. Currently, 
auditing configurations that are available are inherently tied to one-size-fits-all security 
templates. (e.g. NIST EC, NIST SSLF, NSA SNAC, etc.)  There exists a need for a method 
which assists an organization in tailoring its auditing based on its unique security 
requirements. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
Organizations are aware of threats to their information resources, and spend 
countless hours and money attempting to protect them. Most of their efforts are 
concentrated on countermeasures aimed at protecting against threats from outside the 
organization, but organizations often overlook protecting information against the insider 
threat. The threat from malicious insiders is substantial, and worth serious consideration. 
One strategy to protect against malicious insiders is detecting their activity through 
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auditing. This is usually done within organizations, and usually blindly through the use of 
preexisting auditing configurations. Currently, there exists no defined methodology for 
creating a customized auditing template based on organizational security requirements. 
1.3. Assumptions 
In order to use the methodology developed in this study, an organization needs to 
have identified security requirements so that it can properly address them. This is 
accomplished by performing a risk analysis. Before applying the results of this thesis, it is 
assumed that a risk analysis has been accomplished already. 
1.4. Scope 
There are currently many existing threats to an organization’s information 
infrastructure. The focus of this study is on the insider threat because it is difficult to 
mitigate. Auditing can be extremely effective at detecting insider threats if configured 
properly. This study is limited to the use of local workstation auditing with local users 
only. 
1.5. Overview 
This research has developed a 4-step methodology which when used to creates a 
customized auditing template that is more beneficial than using any preexisting auditing 
templates available to support security configuration templates. It includes the steps 
required for setting up and conducting this process. The methodology includes two 
separate methods for creating an auditing template and provides a method for evaluating 
each. 
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1.6. Thesis Overview 
This chapter defines the research goal and provides a brief summary of the 
motivation for developing an organizational customized auditing template. Chapter 2 
presents a literature review and provides background information that supports this 
research. Chapter 3 describes the methodology, experimental setup, and calculations used 
to conduct this research. Chapter 4 presents the experiment results and an analysis of 
those results. Chapter 5 provides conclusions from this research and recommendations for 
additional research in the area of creating auditing templates. 
 
 
 5 
2. II. Literature Review 
2.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the concepts and current trends of insider threats. It also 
presents the current uses of audit logs to monitor workstation activity inside an enterprise 
network to enable an organization to recognize insider threat indicators. The first section 
presents the objectives of information security. The second section offers a definition of 
insider threat including its characteristics and types. It then discusses current trends in the 
area of detecting and mitigating the insider threat. Then various insider attack methods 
and the ways of identifying those methods are discussed. The third section summarizes 
the history of auditing to monitor and identify insider behaviors and its potential role in 
identifying the characteristics of insider threats. The final section discusses the current 
uses of auditing within the workstation environment, its capabilities, and its various 
implementations. 
2.2. Objectives of Information Security 
Protecting an enterprise network against both outside and inside attacks involves 
balancing information system usability with three main security objectives:  
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) describes these three objectives in the Federal Information Processing 
Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 199, which were originally established as part of the 
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 in addition to providing guidance 
on the categorization of information systems. [1, 2]. These three main objectives are ideal 
as the main focus areas that an organization should consider when protecting its 
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information resource assets, however they need to be balanced with usability. It is 
important that information owners within organizations understand these objectives so 
they can better achieve a balance between the security of their organizations information 
and its useability. Now that we have an understanding of the need for the security 
objectives, we define them. 
2.2.1. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is “preserving authorized restrictions on information access and 
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary 
information… [1]”  It refers to the privacy of information, or more specifically which 
individuals, entities, or processes are authorized access to that information at what times 
[3]. Access includes viewing, processing, displaying, processing, and transmitting the 
information. For example, at a medical facility, only patients and medical staff, who 
require access to perform their jobs, can access patient medical records. Ensuring 
confidentiality is critical to an organization because the loss of confidentiality, which can 
lead to the unauthorized disclosure of critical or sensitive information, can lead to severe 
economic losses or loss of life within an organization [1, 4]. 
2.2.2. Integrity 
Integrity is the assurance that “data has not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an 
unauthorized or accidental manner” [3]. It means that trusted information is expected to 
be modified only by duly authorized individuals. For example, in an educational 
institution only authorized staff, such as the registrar, should be able to modify a 
student’s grades, and a professor should be able to view but not modify them. Ensuring 
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integrity within an organization is also critical because the loss of integrity, and the 
ensuing unauthorized modification or destruction of information, can result in the serious 
loss of organizational effectiveness, or serious economic loss [1, 4]. 
2.2.3. Availability 
Availability is “ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information and 
information services…” [1]  The loss of availability results in the disruption of access to 
or use of information or an information system [1, 2].  Information must be available to 
authorized persons, entities, or devices whenever they are required according to the 
information system design [3]. Normally, a premium is put on preserving the availability 
of the most critical (or valuable) information. For example, even the temporary 
unavailability of a financial company’s databases might result in losses of millions of 
dollars. Therefore, the company must put great importance on preserving the availability 
of its databases. An organization should consider allocating appropriate resources to 
protect the availability of resources based on information value to safeguard against loss 
of that information. 
2.3. Insider Threat 
Insider threat is an often misunderstood and overlooked phenomenon. It is 
substantially damaging to an organization and requires attention and understanding if it is 
to be protected against and mitigated. 
2.3.1. Definition of Insider Threat 
The following section defines insider threat and identifies its characteristics. In a 
2004 National Threat Assessment Center Report done by the U.S. Secret Service and 
 8 
CERT Coordination Center Carnegie Mellon University, a comprehensive definition of 
malicious insider threat was presented:    
Current or former employees or contractors who intentionally exceeded or 
misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems or data in a manner 
that targeted a specific individual or affected the security of the organization’s 
data, systems and/or daily business operations [5]. 
 
The term insider threat can be determined to refer to the potential damage to an 
organization caused by the actions of one or more of its trusted agents. The activities 
causing damage can be intentionally malicious acts or simple user mistakes. Every 
organization should conduct a careful analysis of its insider threat situation and 
implement appropriate countermeasures to safeguard their information and information 
systems. 
2.3.2. Insider Threat Trends 
The recent impact of reported insider threat activities has been significant. In a 
2005 Carnegie Mellon Insider Threat Study, it was found that eighty-one percent of 
organizations, who reported insider activity, experienced financial losses ranging from 
$500 to more that $10,000,000 [6]. These reported losses do not include implicit costs, 
such as lost future sales or loss of market capitalization, which are difficult or impossible 
to measure but devastating to an organization [7]. Figure 2.1 shows a trend of decreased 
reported network intrusions, which could be due to an increased awareness and more 
advanced technology to defend against malicious activity. It could also mean that 
organizations are reluctant to report intrusions, primarily because of the bad publicity and 
potential lost revenues associated with the bad publicity [6]. Figure 2.2 illustrates that in 
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2005 eighty-seven percent of organizations are conducting security audits, which is up 
five percent from 2004, which may indicate that they are becoming more aware of the 
benefits of these audits in helping to detect potential intrusions [7-9]. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Attack trends [7] 
2.3.3. Insider Threat Characteristics 
Insiders have the potential to pose a significantly high threat to an organization 
because they are trusted agents. They have knowledge of, and access to, sensitive inside 
information, such as the organization’s network design, security procedures, and 
organizational systems and databases, which potentially gives them opportunity and 
know-how to either damage or steal information [6]. They are also privy to information 
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about any security vulnerabilities the organization might have. Often they hold, or can 
easily gain, higher privileges such as administrative or super-user rights, which makes 
them considerably more capable of performing malicious acts. A recent study by 
Carnegie Mellon looked at case studies and discovered that 77% of the malicious insider 
activity was attributed to full-time employees, and 86% held technical positions. These 
technical positions included system administrators (38%), programmers (21%), engineers 
(14%), and IT specialists (14%) [6]. 
 
Figure 2.2:  Organizations Conducting Security Audits [7] 
2.3.4. Types of Insider Threats 
The threat existing from insiders depends on the intent and activity of the insider 
and is classified by three types:  normal, abnormal, and malevolent. Table 2.1 describes 
the three types of insiders, the activities that they exhibit, and their threat levels. Normal 
insider activities typically do not pose a threat because their activities consist of normal 
day-to-day use of organizational information resources without any abnormal behaviors 
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or situations. Abnormal insider activities are “out of the ordinary” events, and can include 
routine errors. These routine errors can render a system vulnerable, which can cause a 
breach in Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability [10]. Examples of this are system 
administrators forgetting to delete accounts of users who have left the company, users 
leaving themselves logged into their workstations, or users using weak passwords for 
their accounts. These types of routine errors pose a substantial vulnerability to the 
information resources of an organization to intrusion by third parties that take advantage 
of the weaknesses exposed by the abnormal insider activities.   
Malevolent insider activity is activity by individuals with malicious intent of 
stealing or damaging the information of the organization, which poses the greatest threat 
[10]. The motives of these insiders vary but are most often related to revenge. Negative 
work-related events often trigger these threats. In a recent study, United States Secret 
Service and CERT Program Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon 
University found that “in 92% of the cases, a specific event or series of events triggered 
the insider’s actions” [6]. These events include termination of employment (47%), 
dispute with a former employer (20%), and demotion or transfer (13%) [6].  An 
organization should know the characteristics of each of these types of insider threats in 
order to plan an appropriate mitigation strategy. 
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Table 2.1:  Insider Activity Types 
Insider Activity Type Activity Threat 
Normal Typical Behavior Limited 
Abnormal Routine Errors Substantial Threat 
Malevolent Malicious Intent Greatest Threat 
 
2.3.5. Attack Methods 
The vulnerabilities most often exploited by an insider are the lack of, or the 
ineffectiveness of, controls and checks to prevent an insider from removing sensitive data 
from their work areas [11]. In a 2005 study conducted by the U.S. Secret Service and 
Carnegie Mellon’s Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center found that 
a large majority of the reported incidents were not technically sophisticated. They found 
that 61% of the reported malicious insider actions were executed with no technical 
sophistication using simple attack methods such as legitimate user commands, 
information exchanges, or physical attacks [6]. In 60% of these cases, the insider 
compromised an account to carry out the attack, including the use of another user’s 
username and password, or the use of an unauthorized account created by the insider. 
These attacks were successful primarily due to systemic vulnerabilities in 
technology and/or policies, processes, or procedures, such as [6]: 
• Coarse access control restrictions 
• Sloppy accounting procedures 
• Infrequent or non-existent monitoring procedures  
• Insufficient physical access controls  
These attacks were successful primarily due to systematic vulnerabilities in 
technology and/or policies, processes, or procedures, such as 
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• Scripts or malicious programs 
• Autonomous agents 
• Toolkits 
• Flooding 
• Probing 
• Scanning 
• Spoofing 
 
Although malicious insiders usually use relatively uncomplicated methods in 
executing attacks, the very same lack of sophistication can actually make detection more 
difficult due to its resemblance to normal day-to-day activity in the organization. In order 
for organizations to detect malicious insiders, they need to identify any indicators that can 
alert them to possible insider actions.   
2.3.6. Identifying Possible Insider Threats 
The threats posed to an organization both from the inside as well as the outside 
have become more evident in recent years. Studies indicate that most organizations are 
becoming increasingly more aware of the importance and usefulness of technology used 
to combat malicious activity such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and antivirus 
solutions. In the 2005 CSI/FBI survey, 97% of the respondents reported using firewalls, 
72% used intrusion detection systems, and 96% used antivirus software” [7]. These 
technologies mostly have perimeter defenses in mind, which are sufficient at detecting or 
preventing external attempts to access, by-pass, or damage organizational information or 
information systems. However, they do very little to detect insider threats. In a 2005 
Carnegie Mellon University study, it was discovered that the majority of insider attacks 
were not detected by security personnel [6]. Furthermore, the malicious activity was only 
detected because of a noticeable change in the system performance, or because the 
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system simply became unavailable [6]. In the 2004 Carnegie Mellon E-crime Watch 
Survey, nearly half of the organizations reporting insider e-crimes reported that they were 
uncovered accidentally and not as a result of security policies [12]. These studies provide 
evidence to support the requirement to use more resources than perimeter defenses to 
identify attacks especially against insider threats. Organizations must develop effective 
policies and procedures to achieve better protection against the insider threat. One 
potentially useful and often overlooked method is the use of auditing. 
2.4. Auditing 
Auditing is a readily available resource that an organization can use to protect 
against the insider threat. First it must be understood, and its capabilities explored by 
investigating its background and various roles and uses. 
2.4.1. Definition and Evolution of Auditing 
Auditing, which originates from Latin meaning, “To hear”, has been in existence 
for ages [13]. The purposes of an audit are to provide an independent verification, reduce 
errors in record-keeping, reduce misappropriation of assets, and prevent or detect fraud. 
The roots of auditing are summarized by an accounting historian named Richard Brown 
who stated, “Whenever the advance of civilization brought about the necessity of one 
man being entrusted to the extent with the property of another, the advisability of some 
kind of check upon the fidelity of the former would become apparent” [13]. Historians 
believe that formal record-keeping systems were used to account for transactions as far 
back as 4000 BC [13]. Throughout history, people have used different forms of auditing. 
It was considered a prudent measure to ensure that trust was not broken, regardless of if it 
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was intentionally or not. As President Ronald Reagan stated in his farewell address, 
referring to our relationship with Russia after the end of the cold war, Ronald Reagan 
said, “It's still trust, but verify. It's still play, but cut the cards. It's still watch closely. And 
don't be afraid to see what you see” [14]. 
More recently, auditing has been identified as a critical element in the maintaining 
of information security. Auditing information systems is defined by the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), the federal authority in information security 
standards and guidelines, as “the review and analysis of management, operational, and 
technical controls…. In which valuable information about activity on a computer system 
can be obtained” [15]. To keep information systems secure, the United States Federal 
Government has enacted the Computer Security Act of 1987. This act established 
minimum security practices for federal information systems to improve security and 
privacy. It also assigned NIST, with the assistance of the National Security 
Administration (NSA), the responsibility of developing standards and guidelines required 
to implement efficient security and privacy in federal information systems [16]. 
The NIST Special Publication 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information 
Technology Systems, provides guidance on the use of auditing to assist in the assurance 
of an organization’s information and information systems. After security-related events, 
the evaluation of audit logs and the monitoring and tracking of abnormalities in systems 
are key elements for detecting and recovering from security breaches [17]. 
DoD instruction 8500.2 mandates that the collection and retention of all audit data 
be performed by all heads of DoD, as information owners, for the support of technical 
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analysis relating to misuse, penetration reconstruction, or other investigations [4].   This 
instruction also mandates that “an automated, continuous on-line monitoring and audit 
trail creation capability be deployed with the capability to immediately alert personnel of 
any unusual or inappropriate activity with potential Information Assurance (IA) 
implications…” [4] 
2.4.2. Auditing Policy 
In order to effectively use auditing to achieve security objectives, a well-
developed auditing policy needs to be created. The baseline for implementing a good 
auditing policy is to start with a good security policy. An important part of the security 
policy is to identify the roles and responsibilities of individuals within the organization. If 
those roles and responsibilities are not identified, and their duties are not clearly defined, 
then identifying abnormal behaviors of individuals performing those roles through the 
use of auditing becomes increasingly difficult. The policy should also define the role of 
auditing, how auditing is performed, what activities need to be identified, and how 
particular anomalies will be recognized. Also, specific tasks need to be defined, such as 
who will review the logs, how often they will be reviewed, how long they will be stored, 
and appropriate reactions to actions found. In a recent study, CSO Magazine and 
Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute's CERT Coordination Center 
found that only half of organizations have a formal process or system in place for 
tracking e-crime attempts [12]. Without a formal process or system in place for tracking 
e-crime attempts, an organization may not even know if its network has been 
compromised. 
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2.4.3. The Role of Auditing in An Enterprise 
Many occurrences happen within an organization’s information infrastructure that 
can be recognized as potential insider threat activity. Most of these occurrences can be 
logged within the organization, and then observed if the audit logs are regularly reviewed 
by security administrators. As was presented by RAND in its 2004 workshop, there is a 
taxonomy of observables useable for recognizing characteristics of potentially malicious 
insiders (Figure 2.3). As seen in the center of the figure, most of the sub-categories which 
fall under the category Cyber Actions can be recognized through auditing because most 
are performed on information systems that have auditing capabilities. Auditing provides a 
means to accomplish these observations in several areas such as individual 
accountability, reconstruction of events, intrusion detection, and problem analysis [15]. 
 
Figure 2.3:  Taxonomy of Observables [18] 
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2.4.3.1. Individual Accountability 
Managers can use auditing as a technical measure to help maintain individual 
accountability. They can help promote good user behavior by ensuring that users know 
they are personally accountable for their actions and that their actions are tracked by audit 
logs. Users likely will not attempt to circumvent security policies if they know that their 
actions are recorded in audit logs, which are subject to periodic review. Audit trails can 
be used in addition to logical access controls to restrict the use of system resources, to 
analyze user activities and ensure they have not misused their authorized access or 
attempted to gain unauthorized access. For example, if an individual has access to 
sensitive data, such as plans to a new aircraft, audit logs could reveal that those plans had 
been accessed and printed extensively for weeks before quitting, indicating that the 
individual misused his/her authorized access to commit a malicious act [15]. As indicated 
in the RAND study, the malicious insider normally follows a deliberate decision making 
process, which is presented in the spiral model flowchart in Figure 2.4. Once the 
malicious insider reaches the risk analysis step, in which he/she assesses the risk of 
detection prior to committing the attack, he/she then decides whether to continue to 
deliver the attack. If the individual knows that the risk of detection is high, there is a 
greater chance that he/she might decide to stop the attack. This is how auditing, if made 
known throughout the organization can serve as a deterrent to malicious insider activity. 
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Figure 2.4: Spiral Model Flowchart [18] 
2.4.3.2. Reconstruction of Events 
Another benefit of auditing is the ability to reconstruct an event after detecting 
unusual activity, routine errors, or abnormal insider activity, which could present a 
substantial threat to the organization. A forensic team could also be used to examine audit 
trails in order to reconstruct events to assist in solving problems [15]. Reviewing audit 
trails can help determine the event source and the cause of the event, which in turn allows 
for an easier assessment of the damage. The audit trail can also point to whether the 
situation was user induced or system created, and possible reasons that it occurred. A 
good knowledge of the conditions that existed at the time of an event, as well as 
determining the preexisting conditions that led to the event can aid in avoiding its 
occurrence in the future. 
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2.4.3.3. Intrusion Detection 
The role of security auditing in an enterprise network can be extremely important 
because it may often be the only indication of a security breach. If configured to record 
the appropriate information, an organization can use audit logs to assist in intrusion 
detection. Intrusion detection is normally considered a real time solution. Although audit 
logs are not typically considered a real-time solution, advanced auditing can examine 
audit records as they are created, and generate an alert of the potential intrusion. Many 
host-based intrusion detection systems work in this manner. After-the-fact,  intrusions 
can be analyzed in depth by using audit logs to determine what happened, and when it 
occurred, and where the intrusion originated from to ascertain the damage caused by the 
intrusion [15].    The 2005 CSI/FBI survey found that once an insider attack was detected, 
system logs were the most prevalent method of identifying the malicious insider. In 76% 
of these cases, even though the insiders took steps to conceal their identities, the insider 
was identified using several types of logs as can be seen in Figure 2.5 [7].  
Types of Logs Used To Identify Insider Attackers
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Figure 2.5: Types of Logs Used to Identify Insider Attacks [6] 
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A disturbing trend in the annual surveys was that even though over half of the 
respondents surveyed held the position of Chief Information Officer, Chief Security 
Officer, Chief Information Security Officer, Security Officer, or System Administrator 
(Figure 2.6), an average of 37% of them did not know if their company had experienced 
computer crime incidents from the inside (Figure 2.7). With a good auditing policy and 
regular audit reviews, organizations can detect and stop computer crime incidents before 
significant damage is inflicted. 
 
Figure 2.6: 2005 CSI/FBI Respondents by Job Description [7] 
 
Figure 2.7: Number of Incidents from the Inside [7] 
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Robert Hanssen, an FBI Supervisory Special Agent was found guilty of what 
some call “possibly the worst intelligence disaster in US history” [18], when he 
downloaded large quantities of information from the FBI Automated Case Support 
System. He also searched the Bureau’s system for any information on his detection, 
installed unauthorized software on his office workstation, and even hacked onto a Bureau 
colleague’s workstation. After the fact, audit logs and trails were used to trace his activity 
and the damage he caused. If the FBI had monitored these audit logs regularly, or in real 
time, they likely would have caught Mr. Hanssen sooner and minimized any damage he 
caused [18]. After he was caught, he was quoted as saying, “If I thought the risk of 
detection was very great, I would have never done it.”  As a result of his case, the 
Department of Justice reported the following in its after action report [19]: 
The FBI should implement measures to improve computer security, including: 
(a) Establishing an audit program to detect and give notice of unauthorized 
access to sensitive cases on a “real-time” basis 
(b) Establishing an audit program designed to track when employees or 
contractors are using the FBI’s computer systems to determine whether 
they are under investigation… 
In piecing together the chain of events of an intrusion to determine what occurred 
in an after-the-fact analysis, audit logs play a major role. The Microsoft Security Risk 
Management Guide describes a six step approach to follow when investigating incidents.  
Figure 2.8 provides a graphical representation of the six step process. Auditing plays a 
key role in the fourth step called “determine cause” which is identifying the cause of 
damage to a network or individual workstation. A thorough review of the audit logs on 
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the affected system, as well as other influential devices around them, could give valuable 
insight into where the attack originated [20]. 
2.4.3.4. Problem Analysis 
Auditing can be used for problem analysis in quasi real-time to identify potential 
problems in system performance. Quasi real-time auditing of systems can monitor 
performance status and allow timely reaction to possible critical changes or system halts 
due to operator input errors or system errors. These indicators pinpoint the cause of errors 
and allow the organization either to remedy the situation before experiencing 
 
Figure 2.8:  Incident Response Process [20] 
adverse performance, or to find the root of the problem and solve it. For example, quasi 
real-time auditing can alert a system administrator when a computer hard drive is filling 
up unusually fast. This early warning gives the system administrator an opportunity to 
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investigate the cause of the problem and potentially solve it before the system crashes. A 
thorough investigation can provide information to prevent future occurrences. 
2.5. Related Research 
One of the largest areas of research in the area of detecting insider threats has 
been in the area of intrusion detection. Detection techniques have largely focused in the 
area of alert correlation analysis. Because of the high amounts of alerts generated by 
intrusion detection devices and audit logs, various methods have been developed to 
correlate audit logs and Intrusion Detection System logs to make them easier to manage 
by security professionals. One area of alert correlation is with the probabilistic approach 
in which alerts that match closely are fused together in groups of similar events [32, 33]. 
By matching similarities in these events and then putting them into a hierarchy of 
similarities, the number of alerts are reduced to a level that is more manageable [34]. 
Another area of alert correlation is rule based alert correlation, also known as the data-
mining approach [23, 35, 36]. In this method, once the alerts are correlated they are 
scoured for sets of rules based on known attacks. A particular known attack is broken 
down into steps, identifiable by sets of rules. This approach greatly reduces the number of 
false alarms, but only works for misuse detection and is not effective for anomaly 
detection [32]. 
These research undertakings seem useful in addressing the problems caused by 
large numbers of intrusion detections being done on large enterprise networks. They 
address ways of automating the task of sorting through them for indicators of attacks. A 
particular area that doesn’t appear to have been researched recently is in the area of log 
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consistency. Specifically, what can be done within an organization using existing 
workstation auditing, in conjunction with other available technologies, to identify 
potential insider threats?  Research on the configuration of auditing on individual 
workstation to better identify insider threats is needed so that it can be known that the 
logs being correlated and scoured are filled with appropriate audit events.  That way it 
can be known that they can detect possible attacks or malicious behavior. This is what 
this thesis discusses. 
2.6. Types and Categories of Auditing 
In order to understand the methodology presented in this thesis, the current types 
of auditing being used, the auditing categories, and how they function within a Microsoft 
Windows XP® operating system must first be understood. 
2.6.1. Workstation Auditing Overview 
An organization’s audit policy determines the security events to record in order to 
capture enough details about user, administrator, or system activity. Administrators can 
monitor security-related activity, such as when a subject accesses an object, when users 
or administrators log on or off workstations, or if a user attempts to change a system’s 
security policy. The audited events are instrumental in identifying an insider event. 
Failing to collect key activities hinders the ability to identify potentially malicious 
insiders. On the other hand, capturing too many activities fills the audit logs with less 
valuable entries and complicates the filtering process in addition to escalating the cost. 
Therefore, an organization must plan for a balance between capturing all events and the 
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minimum required number of activities. In addition, the organization must decide which 
types of audit logs to monitor and which categories to audit within those logs [21].   
Figure 2.9 shows the alert stream complexities phenomenon in which the number 
of events captured is directly proportional to a larger event space, which induces cost in 
both storage space and difficulty in filtering appropriate events [22]. This problem is 
known as alert flooding, in which a large number of alerts are presented to the operator, 
who has difficulty coping with the load [23]. This phenomenon also occurs with Intrusion 
Detection Systems. 
 
Figure 2.9: Alert Stream Complexities [22] 
Maintaining audit logs is a complicated undertaking. With so many users, 
administrators, and systems being audited the amounts and sizes of the logs can be 
overwhelming. Since accurately monitoring administrator activities is extremely 
important and administrators have the capability of manipulating the logs to possibly 
cover their tracks, it is a good idea to log all activity to a remote logging server. A remote 
logging server also makes maintaining the audit logs easier. 
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2.6.2. Remote Logging 
With auditing enabled on workstation computers, the default configuration is to 
log all audited events to the local machine. In a Windows XP® environment, it is logged 
to the System32/Configuration directory as an “.evt” file. An inside attacker with 
sufficient skills can delete these files to cover his tracks, so a good practice is to set up 
remote security auditing, or logging to a remote computer on the network. A Syslog 
Server approach accomplishes this by the use of various third party software such as 
NTsyslog or Kiwi Syslog Daemon. The logs stored on a Syslog server should be 
protected from access by anyone except security personnel [24]. Another advantage of 
using a remote logging server is that it makes regular automated or manual reviews of 
these logs less complicated. Also, the storage and backup of these audit logs is easier 
with the use of a robust server with a lot of storage space and a scheduled backup policy. 
2.6.3. Types of Audit Logs 
Within most of the Microsoft Windows® operating systems there are three main 
types of audit logs. They are the application log, the system log, and the security log. 
Table 2.2 provides a description of each type. On Windows XP® systems the default 
configuration disables all security auditing. Security administrators must therefore 
carefully select which categories of events and what types of auditing they want to audit 
on their organizations workstations [25]. 
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Table 2.2:  Types of Audit Logs [26] 
Log Type Description 
Application  The application log contains events logged by commercial off-the-
shelf applications, and user programs.  For example, a database 
program might record a file error in the application log.  Program 
developers generally decide which events to monitor in this log. 
System The system log contains events logged by system components such as 
system processes and device drivers.  For example, a device driver 
failure, hardware failure, or failure of a system component to load 
during startup(such as a service) is recorded in the system log.   
Security The security log can record security events such as changes in user’s 
privileges, changes in the audit policy, file and directory access, and 
system logons and logoffs.  For example, when logon auditing is 
enabled, an event is recorded in the security log each time a user 
attempts to log onto the computer.   
 
System and application logging are enabled by the operating system by default. 
They are both very useful for troubleshooting purposes, but are seldom used in 
identifying malicious acts. Security auditing captures security events such as 
unauthorized access, malicious attacks, or unusual occurrences that might warrant 
investigation [24]. Modification of the local policy to disable or limit security logging 
requires administrator privileges. By default, any user on a system can view the 
application and system logs, but only administrators can view the security log. This log, 
if configured to audit the correct events, is the most useful log to gather information 
about activity during an incident response. There are nine categories of security auditing, 
each with separate characteristics and the ability to capture different types of events. Each 
of these categories can be set to either:  No auditing, Success Auditing, Failure Auditing, 
or both Success and Failure Auditing [27]. Table 2.3 explains each in more detail. 
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Table 2.3: Auditing Settings [26] 
Setting Description 
No Auditing No audit entry is generated for the associated action.  
Success 
Auditing 
An audit entry is generated when the requested action succeeds.  For 
example, a user attempts to log in and is successful it will be logged.  
Failure 
Auditing 
An audit entry is generated when the requested action fails.  For 
example, a user attempts to log in and is unsuccessful it will be logged. 
Success and 
Failure 
Auditing 
An audit entry is generated either when a requested action succeeds or 
fails.  For example, a user attempts to login and either succeeds or 
fails, it will be logged either way. 
 
2.6.4. Categories of Audit Logs 
In most Microsoft Operating Systems, specifically Microsoft Windows XP® 
Professional, there are nine categories of auditable events configurable for auditing. 
Table 2.4 briefly explains each category. The following sections describes the uses of 
these configurations as well as an overview of implications of their settings. 
2.6.4.1. Audit Account Logon Events 
This category is designed for the auditing of remote logons. In this category, 
events for logging on or logging off remotely are logged by the computer that is used to 
validate the account. An example of this is a domain controller logging all logons to 
workstations or shared resources such as file servers or shared printers within its domain. 
For a local machine account, the local machine logs local logins into this category for a 
local account. 
2.6.4.2. Audit Account Management 
In this category, events are logged tracking attempts to create new users or 
groups, rename users or groups, enable or disable user accounts, change account  
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Table 2.4: Auditing Categories [28] 
Category Effect 
Audit account logon 
events 
Audits logon attempts to a local account on a computer.  
If the user account is a domain account, this event also 
appears on the domain controller. 
Audit account 
management 
Audits the creation, modification, and deletion of user 
and group accounts, in conjunction with password 
changes and resets. 
Audit directory service 
access 
Audits access to objects in the Active Directory service.
Audit logon events Audits attempts to log on to workstations and member servers. 
Audit object access 
Audits attempts to access an object such as a file, 
folder, registry key, or printer that has defined audit 
settings within that object’s system access control list 
(SACL). 
Audit policy change Audits any change to a user rights assignment, audit, account, or trust policies. 
Audit privilege use Audits each instance that a user exercises a user right, such as changing the system time. 
Audit process tracking Audits application behavior such as program starts or terminations. 
Audit system events 
Audits computer system events such as startup and 
shutdown and events that affect system security or the 
security log. 
 
passwords, and enable auditing for account management events. If this category is 
enabled for auditing, administrators can track events to detect malicious, accidental, and 
authorized creation of user and group accounts. This category is best suited for keeping 
an eye on the actions of administrators to make sure they are performing within the 
parameters of the organization security policy. 
2.6.4.3. Audit Logon Events 
When auditing “logon events”, the system records events involving the creation 
and destruction of logon sessions to its local machine regardless of whether the local 
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machine is on the network or not. These events occur on the computer accessed, as 
opposed to the one that validates the account and may not necessarily be the one accessed 
as in Audit Account Logon Events. For example, if a network logon was performed to 
access a share on a file server, these events are generated on the file server itself. Without 
selecting this category for auditing, it is difficult or impossible to determine which user 
has either accessed or attempted to access computers in an organization. The events in 
this category are useful for detecting a malicious user unplugging a workstation from the 
network, breaking into it, then attempting to gain access to the network. 
2.6.4.4. Audit Object Access 
Enabling object access auditing records the events of a user accessing an object, 
such as a file, folder, registry key, or printer that has a specified System Access Control 
List (SACL) configured. By itself this policy setting does not log any events, because 
each individual object audited must have a SACL configured. A SACL is comprised of 
Access Control Entries (ACE). Each ACE contains three pieces of information [21]: 
• The security principal (user, computer, or group) to be audited when they 
attempt to access the object. 
  
• The specific access type to be audited (such as read data, write data, delete, 
or full control), called an access mask. 
  
• A flag to indicate whether to audit failed access events, successful access 
events, or both. 
 
 Organizations should carefully consider the actions to capture when they 
configure SACLs, because they can be extremely useful in detecting particular insider 
threats based on security goals. For example, it is a good practice to enable tracking of 
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user writes and appends on executable files to track when they are changed or replaced, 
because computer viruses, worms, and Trojan horses typically target executable files. 
Additionally, tracking user accesses and modifications of sensitive documents can help to 
determine possible unauthorized access or malicious activity [29].   
2.6.4.5. Audit Policy Change 
This category configures auditing of every incident of a change to user’s rights 
assignment policies, trust policies, or changes to the audit policy itself. This category 
assists in monitoring the activities of administrators. Any configuring or changing of any 
of the workstation or server policies within an organization should be investigated to 
determine if it was authorized or not. This category identifies  malicious users attempt to 
circumvent auditing by changing the audit policy or clearing the audit logs, which is a 
common technique used to cover up any malicious insider activity. 
2.6.4.6. Audit Privilege Use 
This category configures auditing of each instance of a user exercising a user 
right. Examples of this are a user exercising the shutdown system privilege to shut down 
or reboot a machine, or the take ownership privilege of a file or directory. These events 
can be informative about the occurrences of malicious activity but can generate a very 
large number of event records. 
2.6.4.7. Audit Process Tracking 
This category configures auditing of detailed tracking information for events such 
as program activation, process exit, handle duplication, and indirect object access.   If the 
organization security policy lists authorized processes executable by users and 
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administrators within the organization it can identify unauthorized programs running such 
as a Trojan horse, a rootkit, or other type of malicious software. It can also be beneficial 
during an incident response by providing a detailed log of the processes started and the 
time when they were started [21]. 
2.6.4.8. Audit System Events 
This category audits system events such as starting or shutting down computers,  
event logs filling up, the audit logs being cleared, or other security-related events that 
affect the entire system.  These events may help determine instances of unauthorized 
system access, or critical circumstances that affect system security. For example, clearing 
the audit logs would log an event 517, which would indicate that the audit log was 
cleared. This could be an indication of a malicious user covering his/her tracks. 
2.6.5. Security Templates 
By default, Windows XP® is designed with user ability in mind and has limited 
security enabled. Even fully patched with Service Pack 2 and all security updates, 
Microsoft does not recommend the use of Windows XP® out-of-the-box default security 
configuration on most enterprise networks [21]. There are many security settings that can 
be configured, and Microsoft has suggested settings for an enterprise network. In order to 
ensure that enterprise network security policies are applied to enterprise workstations, 
security policies on individual workstations can be deployed with the use of security 
templates. Security templates are text based files that contain values for security related 
system settings, and make configuring those settings easier to manage and implement. 
Administrators can create and update them using the Security Templates Microsoft 
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Management Console (MMC) snap-in. These templates can be applied to a local 
computer as an individual file, or to an entire group using Active Directory.   
To configure a Windows XP® workstation for enterprise client network use, 
Microsoft suggests starting with their enterprise client security template and configure it 
for the organizations needs [21]. There are other recommended security templates 
available such as those recommended by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) and the National Security Administration (NSA).   
These security templates are designed for desktop workstations on an enterprise 
network. Among these are the NIST Enterprise Client Desktop (NIST EC), NIST 
Specialized Security Limited Functionality Desktop (NIST SSLF), and NSA Systems and 
Network Attack Center Enterprise Client Desktop (NSA SNAC). Table 2.5 contains a 
comparison between the audit settings of these configurations. 
2.6.5.1. NIST EC, NIST SSLF, and NSA SNAC EC Security Templates 
The NIST as well as the NSA have worked together with the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), SysAdmin Audit 
Network Security Institute (SANS), Center for Internet Security (CIS) and other vendors 
to develop a set of benchmark security guides to provide a basic security template of 
security settings for use in various environments [31]. NIST has developed several 
security templates for Windows XP® that are recommended for use within enterprise 
networks. For typical enterprise network use they recommend using the Enterprise Client 
security template. The enterprise environment, also known as managed environment,  
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typically consists of large organizational systems with defined suites of hardware and 
software configurations. They usually consist of centrally managed workstations and 
servers protected from threats on the internet with firewalls and other network security 
devices [30]. For systems with a higher risk profile or risk exposure, NIST recommends 
the Specialized Security-Limited Functionality (SSLF) security template. These include 
systems that contain confidential information (i.e. personnel records, medical records, 
and financial information) or perform vital organizational functions (i.e. accounting, 
payroll processing, air traffic control) [30]. These systems are more likely to be attacked 
Table 2.5: Audit Settings of Security Templates[21, 30, 31] 
Audit Setting 
Windows 
XP® Out of 
the Box 
NIST EC 
Template 
NIST SSLF 
Template 
NSA  
SNAC 
Template 
Audit account logon 
events No Auditing Success 
Success, 
Failure 
Success, 
Failure 
Audit account 
management No Auditing Success 
Success, 
Failure 
Success, 
Failure 
Audit directory service 
access No Auditing
No 
Auditing No Auditing 
No 
Auditing 
Audit logon events No Auditing Success Success, Failure 
Success, 
Failure 
Audit object access No Auditing No Auditing Failure Failure 
Audit policy change No Auditing Success Success Success, Failure 
Audit privilege use No Auditing No Auditing Failure Failure 
Audit process tracking No Auditing No Auditing No Auditing 
No 
Auditing 
Audit system events No Auditing Success Success Success, Failure 
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by either outside or inside malicious parties. The auditing security settings in the  NIST 
SSLF security template are considerably more intensive than in NIST EC, and much more 
information can be obtained from the audit logs. The drawback is that there is much more 
information logged, resulting in a lot of information to sort through in order to find useful 
information about an incident. The NSA SNAC Security Template is similar to the NIST 
SSLF, but has some minor differences in the auditing configuration. Table 2.5 shows the 
differences between the auditing settings of the security templates. In this thesis, the 
auditing capabilities of these security templates will be tested and compared with a 
customized auditing template created by the presented methodology. 
2.7. Summary 
This chapter has described the objectives for maintaining information security 
within an enterprise network. It has also covered trends, characteristics, and types of 
insider threats. Attack methods and ways of identifying insider threats were also 
presented. Next, auditing was covered with a discussion on the definition of auditing, the 
audit policy in an organization, and the role of auditing in the enterprise. Finally the types 
of auditing, the categories of auditing, and the use of security templates were discussed. 
3.  
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4. III. Methodology 
3.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter outlines the methodology used for developing a customized auditing 
template for a computer workstation, the calculations and metrics used in this process, 
and a method for evaluating the end product. It begins with a presentation of the research 
goals and the approach taken to achieve these goals. Following sections define the system 
under test, the component under test, and the experimental design. Next the system setup 
and data collection are presented. Finally, the evaluation technique, calculations 
performed, and metrics used are described.   
3.2. Problem Definition 
In addition to perimeter defenses, organizations often take advantage of available 
resources to ensure security within the organization, such as the existing auditing 
capabilities of Windows XP®. Often this is done blindly using existing security templates 
recommended for use by NIST and NSA, without research into the auditing configurations 
these templates contain, and how they meet their organizations requirements for 
computer security. Rather than rely on existing client workstation auditing 
configurations, an organization should know exactly what events its client workstations 
are auditing, and configure the clients to audit based on computer security requirements 
of the organization [29]. Currently there exists no defined methodology for creating a 
customized auditing template based on organizational security requirements. 
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3.2.1. Research Goals 
The primary goal of this research is the establishment of a methodology for 
developing a customized auditing template for a computer workstation to audit for insider 
threats. It develops an insider threat client workstation-auditing model to create a tailored 
auditing template for a Windows XP® workstation based on organizational computer 
security requirements. This model uses the existing auditing capabilities of Windows 
XP® and fine-tunes them to audit malicious insider activities.    
3.2.2. Approach 
An evaluation of the auditing categories available for configuration in Windows 
XP® is performed to determine which configuration best detects the selected simulated 
malicious insider scenarios. The categories available for configuration within Windows 
XP® will each be enabled individually, one at a time, while all others are disabled to 
evaluate the events logged for a particular category. There are currently nine auditing 
categories in Windows XP®. A series of 18 malicious insider scenarios, as well as non-
malicious scenarios consisting of simulated typical user behaviors, are simulated and the 
logs resulting from these activities are analyzed. There are 18 scenarios simulated, and 15 
minutes of activities representative of normal user activity. The two questions to be 
answered are:  
1. Was the malicious activity detected in the logs with the current 
category enabled?  This would indicate that the particular category is 
either useful or not for detecting that type of activity. 
2. What is the particular cost involved in this identification?  In other 
words, what is the ratio of the events that identify the malicious activity 
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to the number of other events in the logs?  This will indicate the ease of 
identifying the malicious activity. 
These two questions are answered for each particular category of auditing within 
Windows XP®. All categories are then compared, and selected or deselected for auditing 
based on the criteria presented later in this chapter. The end result is a customized 
auditing template based on the malicious scenarios selected. Finally, an evaluation of the 
auditing template can be made based upon other preexisting auditing configurations 
inside one-size-fits-all security templates (e.g. NIST EC, NIST SSLF, NSA SNAC, etc.)  
3.3. System Boundaries 
The system boundaries consist of the System Under Test (SUT), the Component 
Under Study (CUS), the type of data input into them, and the processing of the output 
from them. 
3.3.1. Auditing System 
The System Under Test (SUT) is the Windows XP® auditing system running 
inside a virtual computer, using VmWare Workstation (Figure 3.1). It is a basic 
installation of Windows XP® Professional with Service Pack 2 and all Microsoft security 
patches as of February 28, 2006. The SUT includes an adjustable auditing configuration, 
which is the Component Under Study (CUS). The parameters are the nine auditing 
categories, configured one at a time to audit success and failure, while all other categories 
record nothing. The input for the SUT is the group of 18 simulated malicious scenarios, 
and the non-malicious (normal user) scenarios. All scenarios are manually executed 
through the SUT, independently one at a time while the CUS audits for success and 
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failure. The Windows XP® system audits accordingly and records detectable events in a 
security log. After each test run is complete, the virtual machine is reset to the baseline 
configuration. This is accomplished using a VmWare snapshot.  
The scope of the experiment is limited to a single workstation operating in 
VmWare without network connectivity. It is designed to simulate the security 
implications of multiple users sharing a common workstation. The workstation does not 
include the logging of network access and interaction with other workstations, servers, or 
peripheral devices.   
System Under Test
Output
EventcombMT
Filters insider 
threat events
Input
Parameters:
Configuration of the Nine Auditing Categories one at 
at time to be set to audit success and audit failure.
Auditing 
Configuration
Access DB
VmWare Running 
WinXP
Professional
Evaluation and Answer
To Questions 1 and 2
Saved Event 
logs (as .evt
and .csv files)
CUSMalicious and 
Non-Malicious 
Insider 
Behavior
Scenarios
 
Figure 3.10:  Windows XP® Auditing System 
3.4. Parameters 
The system parameters are the audit category settings. Currently there are nine 
audit categories for the Windows XP® workstation. Each category has four configuration 
settings, (1) no auditing, (2) audit success, (3) audit failure, or (4) both audit success and 
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failure. To represent these, each of the nine categories is represented by 2 switches, one 
for success audit, and one for failure audit. This represents each of the four 
configurations; (1) Neither success switch nor failure switch is enabled = no audit, (2) 
success switch is on, failure switch is off = success audit, (3) success switch is off, failure 
switch is on = failure audit, and (4) both success and failure switches are on = both 
success and failure audit. Table 3.1 shows these switches and their corresponding audit 
categories. The resulting logs are parsed into success and failure audits for further 
evaluation and analysis. 
Table 3.1:  Switches and Corresponding Categories and Settings 
Switch Corresponding Category and Setting
S1 Success Audit Account Logon Events
F1 Failure Audit Account Logon Events
S2 Success Audit Account Management
F2 Failure Audit Account Management
S3 Success Audit Directory Service Access
F3 Failure Audit Directory Service Access
S4 Success Audit Logon Events
F4 Failure Audit Logon Events
S5 Success Audit Object Access
F5 Failure Audit Object Access
S6 Success Audit Policy Change
F6 Failure Audit Policy Change
S7 Success Audit Privilege Use
F7 Failure Audit Privilege Use
S8 Success Audit Process Tracking
F8 Failure Audit Process Tracking
S9 Success Audit System Events
F9 Failure Audit System Events  
 
3.5. Data Collection 
The output from the SUT for each scenario is parsed into success and failure 
fields in a Microsoft Excel® worksheet, and then grouped by category. EventcombMT, a 
free utility available from Microsoft, is used to parse the logs to find known logged 
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events that correspond to the malicious actions performed. EventcombMT is configured 
with a list of common events which are indicative of malicious insider activities. The 
EventcombMT output is saved to a Microsoft® Access Database for further analysis to 
identify simulated malicious insider actions.  
3.6. System Setup 
The virtual machine consists of VmWare, version 5.0.0, build 13124. The 
hardware platform consists of a Toshiba laptop with a Pentium IV 3.06 GHz Processor, 
and 896 MB of Random Access Memory. The Virtual Operating System is Windows 
XP® Professional. The operating system is patched with Service Pack 2 and all available 
security patches from the Microsoft Update website as of 28 February 2006.  
3.7. Procedure 
Each time a group of scenarios is simulated, the following steps are completed to 
ensure that the samples obtained are completely individual and specific to the current 
switch setting: 
1. Load VMWare snapshot – This resets the virtual machine to the baseline for each 
group of scenarios to run within a specific audit category. 
2. Configure Category – The particular audit category under test is configured to 
enable both success and failure auditing.  All others are set to no auditing. 
3. Wipe audit logs – All logs (application, security, and system) are cleared to 
ensure that there are not any other logged events in them. 
4. Perform test run – The 18 malicious scenarios, as well as the non-malicious 
scenarios (simulated normal user activity) are manually executed using a 
checklist of exactly what is to be performed.   
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5. Save log files – Upon completion of the test run, all audit logs (application, 
security, and system) are saved as .evt and .csv files for later analysis offline. 
6. Evaluate log files – Upon completion of all scenarios for a particular audit 
category, the security audit logs are evaluated to determine if they logged the 
identifying events, and their events are separated by scenario for further analysis. 
3.8. Experimental Design 
The experimental design for this research is a factorial design with one factor, the 
auditing settings [37].  The source of randomness in this experiment was the scenarios. 
The number of experiments performed: 
• Number of scenarios = 18 
• Number of auditing settings = 9 categories * 4 settings each = 36 
Total number of experiments (18) * (36) = 648 
 
3.9. Malicious Scenarios  
A critical factor in the methodology is the selection of malicious scenarios. An 
organization needs to select these scenarios carefully to ensure they represent their 
identified insider threat security requirements. For this experiment, the scenarios are 
selected based upon possible requirements of a typical organization. For this experiment 
eighteen scenarios are selected as an example of possible scenarios an organization might 
select. The scenarios focus on protecting the confidentiality of files on a shared 
workstation. The scenarios simulate multiple users using a common workstation, and a 
malicious user attempting to access other users files. The scenarios simulate various 
techniques that a malicious insider might use to obtain access to vital information.  
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Privileges held by administrators as well as normal users are represented in the scenarios. 
The scenarios are presented in Appendix A and described step by step in Appendix B.   
3.10. Non-malicious Scenarios (Simulated Normal User Activity) 
In order to gain an understanding of the size and typical number of entries 
captured in a workstation audit log, some non-malicious, normal user, activities are 
simulated. This consists of typical activities that normal users do in day-to-day use of a 
workstation. A selection of 15 minutes worth of typical normal activities such as word 
processing, spreadsheet creation, and internet browsing were used in the experiment. A 
list of these activities can be found in Appendix C. The events logged are then 
extrapolated to get one weeks worth of normal user activity. To simulate this, the 15 
minutes of normal user activity is multiplied by 160. This one-week worth of normal user 
activity is called the Calculated Normal User Count (CNUC). It is used in calculations to 
help determine the best auditing configuration for logging the malicious scenarios. One 
week of normal user activity is chosen as an example, and an assumption is made that a 
security administrator can check a particular workstation once a week for malicious 
activity and would therefore sort through one week’s worth of normal user activity. In a 
real case situation, an organization would know its security administration procedures 
and select a period of time more realistic to their organization based on their security 
procedures. 
The non-malicious activity is not intended to be directly representative of typical 
normal user activity, but only to serve as a controlled, consistent method of generating 
typical user activities in no specific order. This strategy helps introduce deterministic 
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activity with malicious activity to the SUT. Another approach is for an organization using 
this model to generate an average event count from actual logs on various workstations 
within the organization, which would be a more accurate representation of normal user 
behavior. 
3.11. Evaluation Technique 
Once the results from the malicious scenarios are collected and evaluated, they 
are put into a table for ease of analysis to determine the best selection of switches for an 
organization based on their security requirements, an example is shown in Table 3.3. In 
this example, the scenario detections are in bold. This table, along with the calculations 
presented in the section 3.10.1, and the selection criteria presented in section 3.10.2 will 
enable an organization to select the best categories to select for auditing in their audit 
configuration. 
Table 3.3:  Breakdown of Events and Detections 
Scenarios S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Scenario Detected
1a 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 2 0 Yes
2a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 Yes
3a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 Yes
4a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 108 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Yes
5a 1 7 2 0 0 0 6 6 86 0 0 0 1 0 35 0 0 0 Yes
6a 3 7 6 0 0 0 11 7 21 0 0 0 11 0 88 0 0 0 Yes
7a 2 8 1 0 0 0 7 8 33 0 0 0 10 0 47 0 0 0 Yes
8a 0 1 1 0 0 0 9 2 17 0 0 0 10 0 46 0 0 0 Yes
9a 3 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 6 0 0 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 Yes
10a 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 Yes
11u 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 0 0 0 No
12u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 Yes
13u 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 108 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 Yes
14a 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 76 78 0 0 13 0 22 0 0 0 Yes
15a 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 1 0 6 0 13 0 1 0 Yes
16u 1 4 0 0 0 0 9 4 12 3 1 0 39 0 40 0 28 0 Yes
17u 2 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 73 0 12 0 22 0 36 7 16 0 Yes
18u 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 11 0 8 0 30 0 0 0 Yes
Total Events 17 33 12 0 0 0 95 32 461 298 26 0 130 0 409 7 47 0
Total Detects Per Switch 3 0 6 0 0 0 3 0 7 3 2 0 2 0 3 0 3 0
Categories (Switches)
 
 
 
 46 
 
   
3.11.1.   Auditing Template Creation Methods 
There are two methods used for creating a custom auditing template, the Switch 
Evaluation Method (SEM), and the Configuration Evaluation Method (CEM). Each 
serves a different purpose, and it is suggested that an organization try both methods to 
determine which works best for their security requirements.  
3.11.2.   Switch Evaluation Method 
The SEM uses calculations, metrics, and organization established criteria to assist 
in creating a Windows XP® auditing template based on a per switch evaluation. It uses 
metrics for evaluating the quality of a given switch at detecting the malicious act, as well 
as the cost involved in that detection. The development of metrics allows the comparison 
of the switches to determine the best combination to put into the Windows XP® 
workstation auditing template. In this method, seven metrics were created for measuring 
the effectiveness of a given auditing category given that a set of malicious scenarios is 
encountered. The metrics used for this method are: 
  1. Switch Detection Coverage (SDC) 
  2. Calculated Normal User Count (CNUC) 
 3. Switch Activity Cost (SAC) 
 4. Total Activity Cost (TAC) 
 5. Switch False Positive Count (SFPC) 
 6. Switch Figure of Merit, (SFOM) 
Switch Detection Coverage (SDC), is the metric that identifies how well a given 
switch performs at detecting a given set of scenarios. Calculated Normal User Count 
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(CNUC), is a calculated amount of simulated weekly normal user activities. Switch 
Activity Cost (SAC), is the total number of logged events for a given switch after running 
the malicious scenarios, the non-malicious scenario, and calculating the CNUC. Total 
Activity Cost (TAC), is the total of all switch SAC’s. Switch False Positive Count 
(SFPC), is the total number of false positives of a switch after running the malicious 
scenarios and calculating the CNUC. After the previous metrics have been derived, the 
Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM), is created by constructing a weighted function of these 
metrics. The SFOM metric will allow for an objective comparison of performance 
between the individual switches. The weights assigned in the function are selected to 
scale the importance of each of the constituent metrics according to organizational 
security requirements. In addition, formulation of the problem in this form enables the 
optimal selection of auditing categories by using existing linear optimization 
methodologies.  
In order to represent each of the metrics and the switch figure of merit, the 
problem is loosely framed in the context of set theory [38]: 
Auditing configuration is determined by setting or clearing a set of 18 auditing 
switches, both success switches and failure switches (. Each auditing switch takes on one 
of two discrete values, either on or off: 
{ }0,1Value =                                               (Eq. 3.1) 
A Switch, Sx where x = [1..M], is assigned an element of the set Value:  
                  Sx = Value                         (Eq. 3.2) 
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An auditing configuration, AC, consists of a set of M Switches. When an auditing 
configuration is evaluated in it’s entirety based on its current set of M switches, it is 
referred to as ACX:  
{ }1 2, ,...,x MAC S S S=     (Eq. 3.3) 
The scenarios, SC, consist of a malicious scenario set, SCM, a non-malicious 
scenario set, SCN. The malicious scenario set, SCM, consists of the 18 selected simulated 
malicious scenarios: 
{ }1 2 18, ,...,M M M MSC SC SC SC=    (Eq. 3.4) 
The non-malicious scenario set, SCN, consists of one 15 minute scenario 
consisting of simulated typical normal user activity: 
{ }1N NSC SC=     (Eq. 3.5) 
The events are the events that appear in the security audit log after the scenarios 
are executed. They consist of the events from the malicious scenarios, EM , and the events 
from the non-malicious scenarios, EN. The total events for a given switch, Sx, after all 
malicious scenarios, EM , and non-malicious scenarios, EN,  have been executed are Ex  
where { }( )1 2| , ,..., Mx x S S S∈ .  The set of all possible events is the total of all events for 
all switches, ET, as T xE E=∪  where { }( )1 2| , ,..., Mx x S S S∈ . 
In the following sections, we loosely use set theory notation to define metrics that 
represent the effectiveness of a given Switch, S, and a given overall AuditConfiguration, 
AC, when subjected to a given set of scenarios, SCM and  SCN. 
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3.11.2.1. Switch Detection Coverage 
One of the most important metrics in evaluating a switches merit is how well it is 
at detecting a set of scenarios. For this reason, the first metric introduced is the Switch 
Detection Coverage (SDC). A given malicious scenario is deemed to be detected if the 
critical event appears in the security log file. The SDC is a measure of how well an 
individual audit switch did at finding the set of malicious scenarios, SCM. The set of 
malicious scenarios detected, SCD, where D MSC SC⊆ . It is calculated as the number of 
detected scenarios, SCD, divided by the total number of malicious scenarios, SCM, in the 
malicious scenario set for a given audit switch configuration.  
| |
| |
D
Sx
M
SCSDC
SC
=               (Eq. 3.6) 
The SDC is an unbiased indicator at how well a particular audit switch, Sx, is at 
detecting the malicious behavior contained in a given malicious scenario set, SCM. 
For example, suppose an organization, in using the insider threat client 
workstation-auditing model to create their auditing configuration, has created a set of 15 
malicious scenarios in order to determine the effectiveness of the current audit switches. 
They would run each of the scenarios contained in the scenario set for each switch and 
determine which of the scenarios are detected. If 10 of the 15 total scenarios are detected 
for a given switch, the SDC calculation for that switch would be: 
| | 10 0.667
| | 15
S x
D
M
SCSDC
SC
= = =       (Eq. 3.7) 
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While SDC is an effective measure of the detection coverage of a given audit 
switch under a given set of scenarios, it fails to account for the cost in log file size and 
false positives encountered.   
3.11.2.2. Activity Costs 
Activity Costs (AC) are considered an obstruction to identifying the events that 
indicate the malicious act. They are events captured that are not indicative of a malicious 
act. AC’s conceal and obfuscate the events necessary to identify a malicious act. They can 
be thought of as “background noise”. They appear in every malicious and non-malicious 
scenario and must be filtered out to find the events that indicate a malicious act has 
occurred. 
False Positive Events (FPE) have a greater cost than activity costs because they 
are misleading. FPE’s often make the security administrator think that they indicate a 
malicious act when in fact there is no malicious activity. The extra time it takes for a 
security administrator to evaluate and determine the legitimacy of an FPE can be very 
costly.   
3.11.2.3. Calculated Normal User Count 
The auditing switches differ from one another in terms of the events, EX, they 
generate in the security log files. Each event in the log file is an indicator of a specific 
event occurring and incurs a cost in terms of disk storage. To add realism to the model, 
non-malicious normal user activities are simulated to add to the size and complexity of 
the security logs. Non-malicious normal user events are the events that are logged 
continuously, and must be sorted through to find malicious activities. For this study, non-
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malicious normal user events, EN, are calculated for the period of a week, to simulate the 
log size of a workstation that is examined weekly. To calculate the Calculated Normal 
User Count, CNUC, the 15 minute non-malicious scenario events, EN, is multiplied times 
160 to represent a week.   
160 x  | |xS NCNUC E=        (Eq. 3.8) 
For example, suppose an organization is using the insider threat client 
workstation-auditing model and has created a set of 15 non-malicious scenarios contained 
in SCN  in order to determine the effectiveness of a particular audit switch. If they want to 
determine the CNUC obtained using the current audit switch, Sx, they would run the non-
malicious scenario set for 15 minutes, sum the number of normal user events that were 
added to the security log, multiply by 160 to get a weekly count. If they had 17 normal 
user events added to the security log in 15 minutes, the calculation would be: 
160 x  17 2720xSCNUC = =            (Eq. 3.9) 
3.11.2.4. Switch Activity Cost 
As noted earlier, each event, or line in a log file, incurs a cost in terms of disk 
storage and obfuscation. For this reason, activity cost for each switch must be 
determined. The Switch Activity Cost (SAC), is a measure of how many lines are 
generated in the security log files resulting from a given auditing switch, Sx, both from 
the malicious scenarios and from the Calculated Normal User Cost (CNUC). It is 
calculated by taking the sum of the malicious scenarios events, EM, and the CNUC (which 
is EN times 160): 
| |  + |
x
M xS
SAC E CNUC S=          (Eq. 3.10) 
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For example, suppose an organization has created a set of 15 malicious scenarios 
contained in SCM, and 15 minutes of non-malicious normal user activity contained in 
SCN. If they want to determine the SAC, of a particular audit switch, SX, they could test 
each of the scenarios contained in the scenario set and the 15 minutes of normal user 
activity and compute the CNUC for the switch. They then add the malicious scenario 
events, EM,  to the CNUC. If EM is 500 events, and the CNUC was 2720, the calculation 
would be: 
( )500 + 2720 3220
xS
SAC = =       (Eq. 3.11) 
While SAC is an effective measure of the cost in log file lines associated with a 
given audit switch under a given set of malicious and non-malicious scenarios, it fails to 
account for the false positives encountered. 
3.11.2.5. Total Activity Cost 
The Total Activity Cost, TAC, is the total number of activity costs for all 
switches, ST, including malicious scenarios, SCM, and the CNUC (calculated from the 
non-malicious scenarios SCN). It is the set of all possible events, or the total of all events 
for all switches, ET, as T xE E=∪   where { }( )1 2| , ,..., Mx x S S S= . It is calculated as the 
sum of the SAC’s for all switches, or the union of all switch total events, EX: 
T
xS
TAC E=∪       (Eq. 3.12) 
For example, suppose a given  organization has created a set of 15 malicious 
scenarios contained in SCM, and  calculated its CNU from the non-malicious scenario, 
SCN, and the SAC results are as follows:  
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Switch S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
SAC 1320 543 36 1003 920 45 890 63 0 943 54 5 0 0 31 133 920 0  
The calculation would be: 
1320 543 36 1003 920
45 890 63 0 943 54 6906
5 0 0 31 133 920 0
XSTAC
+ + + +⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= + + + + + + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + + + + + +⎝ ⎠
           (Eq. 3.13) 
3.11.2.6. Switch False Positive Count 
Since the detection of a specific scenario is dependant on the detection of a single 
critical event and not a specific chain of events, it is possible that we may believe that we 
have detected malicious behavior when in reality the critical event resulted from a 
legitimate system action. For this reason, the next metric introduced is the Switch False 
Positive Count (SFPC). The SFPC is a measure of how many critical events occurred 
that did not correspond to a malicious scenario given an audit switch, Sx , the set of 
malicious scenarios, SCM, and the set of non-malicious scenarios,  SCN. It is calculated as 
the sum of critical events not detecting a malicious scenario that occurred in the log file 
resulting from the set of malicious scenarios, and the CNUC. It is simply a count of 
events that have the same event numbers as detection but are not detections in the SAC. 
This is not easily defineable by set theory: 
For example, suppose a given organization created a set of 15 malicious scenarios 
contained in SCM, in the current audit switch, Sx, and there were 3 False Positive Events, 
and they also executed a set of 15 minutes of non-malicious scenarios contained in SCN, 
and calculated the CNUC which produced 32 False Positives. The SFPC would be:  
3 + 32 35
xS
SFPC = =       (Eq. 3.14) 
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3.11.2.7. Switch Figure of Merit  
The Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM) is a weighted metric that applies a value to 
each switch based on its performance given the selected scenarios. It allows the switches 
to be objectively compared against each other. To calculate the SFOM, the calculations 
from the following metrics that have been calculated are used. They include the 
following: 
1. Switch Detection Coverage (SDC) 
  2. Calculated Normal User Count (CNUC) 
 3. Switch Activity Costs (SAC) 
 4. Total Activity Costs (TAC) 
 5. Switch False Positive Count (SFPC) 
Each of the metrics identified above provide valuable information about the 
quality of an audit switch, Sx, given a set of malicious scenarios, SCM, and a 
corresponding set of non-malicious scenarios, SCN. However, it is desirable to create a 
single figure of merit that allows for quick and easy comparison of audit categories to 
allow the optimal selection of an auditing template. For this reason, the Switch Figure of 
Merit (SFOM) metric is introduced, combining the Switch Detection Coverage (SDC), 
the Switch Activity Costs (SAC), the Total Activity Costs (TAC), and the Switch False 
Positive Count (SFPC) into a single, derived metric: 
1 2 3 x  |  x  |  x  |
x x xx
S S SS
SAC SFPCS FOM W SDC W W
TAC SAC
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦    (Eq. 3.15) 
No similar metric could be found for this type of application, so this metric was 
contrived specifically for this methodology. The metric takes into consideration, the 3 
most important components of an audit category; the detections, the activity costs, and 
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the false positives. There exists a balance between these three components. The positive 
component (detections) is offset by the negative components (activity costs and false 
positives). If a large number of detections are desired, and auditing switches are selected 
accordingly to audit more events, then the negative affect is an increase in activity costs 
and false positives. On the other hand, if selecting audit switches is based on attempting 
to lower activity costs or false positives, then the total detections will be lowered. This 
metric takes these factors into consideration and provides the capability to assign a 
weight to each of the components of the metric based upon their importance to the 
organizational mission. In parallel to Statistical Decision Theory, in which statistics are 
integrated with decision-making, the selection of weights based upon organizational 
priorities assists in the organization’s creation of an auditing template by enabling a 
tailored organizational balance between high detection rates, log file size, and false 
alarms [39]. The higher each weight, the more importance it is considered to hold, and 
the lower each weight, the less importance. Weight 1, 1W , is applied to detection 
coverage, Weight 2, 2W , is applied to activity cost, and Weight 3, 3W , is applied to false 
positives. If the organization is more concerned with having a higher detection coverage 
and realizes that in order to have this it must tolerate a higher activity cost and a higher 
false positive count, then it can give a higher weighted value to 1W  and a lower weighted 
value to 2W  and 3W . For example an organization in which auditing is so critical that 
missing a detection could cause death or serious economic loss, such as a nuclear facility 
or a financial institution, would probably put more weight on 1W  and less weight on 2W  
and 3W .  If the organization is more concerned with having a lower total cost and 
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number of false alarms, perhaps because it has limited resources for robust auditing, and 
realizes that it will get less detections as a result, then it will put a lower weight on 1W  
and a higher weight on 2W  and 3W .  
For example, suppose a given organization created a set of 15 malicious scenarios 
contained in SCM, in a current audit switch, Sx, and they also executed a set of 15 minutes 
of non-malicious scenarios contained in SCN, and calculated their CNUC. After doing 
their calculations using the given metrics, they had a CDC of 0.667, a CAC of 3220, a 
TAC of 6906, and a CFPC of 34. If they decide that detections are very important to 
them, and costs and false positives are less important and they give 1W  a weight of 10, 
2W  a weight of 2, and 3W  a weight of 2. The Switch Figure of Merit, SFOM, for that 
particular switch would be: 
3220 3410 x  (.667) 2 2 5.6216
6906 587xS
SFOM ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦         (Eq. 3.16) 
The organization would calculate this SFOM for all switches, and then use the 
results to assist in selecting the switches for their auditing template based on the switches 
with the highest SFOM’s. 
If the organization decided that detections are less important, and lower costs and 
false positives is more important and they give 1W  a weight of 2, 2W  a weight of 10, and 
3W  a weight of 10. The Switch Figure of Merit, SFOM, would be: 
 3220 342 x  (.667) 10 10 3.9078
6906 587xS
SFOM ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦         (Eq. 3.17) 
Since in this example the higher weights were given to 2W  and 3W , which are 
subtracted from 1W , it is possible for the CFOM to be a negative number. In this case the 
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organization would compare all switches SFOM’s, and the switches with the least 
negative number (higher of the two) would be more beneficial to the organization.  
It is important to point out that when the organization chooses their weights for 
1W , 2W , and 3W , they will need to be applied to all switches equally. If the organization 
chooses to change those weights, they must change them for all switches.    
3.11.2.8.   Switch Selection Criteria 
Now that all results have been evaluated and calculations made, the organization 
can select the switches for its auditing template. An organization can select criteria to use 
based on its security requirements to select audit switches for its auditing template using 
the calculated SFOM’s as needed for decision making. These are the organizations 
Switch Selection Criteria (SSC). During this experiment, based on the simulated 
organizational security assumptions made earlier, the switches for the auditing template 
were selected based on the following criteria: 
1. The switches are selected so that all scenarios are detected, regardless of 
the SFOM value. 
2. If more than one switch detects the same scenarios, select the switch for 
auditing with the highest SFOM value, and do not select the others. 
3. If a switch did not detect any scenario, then do not select it for auditing. 
These criteria were used in conjunction with the results and calculations to create 
an auditing template. The results and the auditing template selected for this experiment 
are discussed in chapter 4. 
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3.11.3.   Configuration Evaluation Method 
The Audit Selection Criteria mentioned above, using the SFOM appears to be 
sufficient at identifying the best switches to enable for an auditing template, but can be 
considered naïve because it evaluates switches individually based upon their own merit, 
but doesn’t compare sets of them together [3]. Another way of identifying the best 
configuration to identify a given set of malicious activities is to evaluate each possible 
audit configuration in its entirety. This is done using the Configuration Evaluation 
Method (CEM). This method examines all possible audit configurations available, which 
for the 18 switches is 182 , or 262,144 possible configurations. It would be impossible to 
do this manually, but it can be done exhaustively using software. A software program 
developed using C++ for this experiment exhaustively takes each individual audit 
configuration available, calculates a Configuration Figure of Merit (CFOM) metric, and 
presents the best auditing configuration for detecting the given scenarios based on the 
switches with the highest CFOM value. Additionally, it calculates and indicates the 
CFOM  for 3 available auditing configurations in existing security templates; NIST EC, 
NIST SSLF, and NSA SNAC EC. Sample output from this program can be seen in 
Appendix E, and it’s written code can be seen in Appendix F.    
3.11.3.1. Configuration Figure of Merit 
Just like the SFOM, the Configuration Figure of Merit (CFOM) is a weighted 
metric used for objective comparison. It is used to compare multiple audit configurations. 
It applies a value to each configuration based on its performance given the selected 
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scenarios. It allows the configurations to be objectively compared against each other. To 
calculate the CFOM, the calculations from the following metrics are used: 
 1. Configuration Detection Coverage (CDC) 
  2. Configuration Activity Cost (CAC) 
 3. Configuration Total Activity Cost (CTAC) 
 4. Configuration False Positive Count (CFPC) 
Just as with the Switch Evaluation Method (SEM), in order to represent each of 
the metrics and the switch figure of merit, the problem is loosely framed in the context of 
set theory [38]: 
Auditing configuration is determined by setting or clearing a set of 18 auditing 
switches. Each auditing switch takes on one of two discrete values, either on or off: 
{ }0,1Value =                                               (Eq. 3.18) 
A Switch, Sx where x = [1..M], is assigned an element of the set Value:  
                  Sx = Value                       (Eq. 3.19) 
An auditing configuration, AC, consists of a set of M Switches. When an auditing 
configuration is evaluated in it’s entirety based on its current set of M switches, it is 
referred to as ACX: 
{ }1 2, ,...,x MAC S S S=                   (Eq. 3.20) 
The scenarios, SC, consist of a malicious scenario set, SCM, a non-malicious 
scenario set, SCN. The malicious scenario set, SCM, consists of the 18 selected simulated 
malicious scenarios: 
{ }1 2 18, ,...,M M M MSC SC SC SC=                 (Eq. 3.21) 
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The non-malicious scenario set, SCN, consists of one 15 minute scenario 
consisting of simulated typical normal user activity: 
{ }1N NSC SC=          (Eq. 3.22) 
The events are the events that appear in the security audit log for a after the 
scenarios are executed. They consist of the events from the malicious scenarios, EM , and 
the events from the non-malicious scenarios, EN. The total events for a given switch, Sx, 
after all malicious scenarios, EM , and non-malicious scenarios, EN,  have been executed 
are EX  where { }( )1 2| , ,..., Mx x S S S∈ .  The set of all possible events is the total of all 
events for all switches, ET, as T xE E=∪  where { }( )1 2| , ,..., Mx x S S S∈ . 
3.11.3.2. Configuration Detection Coverage 
The Configuration Detection Coverage (CDC) is a measure of how well a 
complete auditing configuration performs at detecting a set of malicious scenarios, SCM.  
It is calculated the same way that the SDC is calculated, with the exception that the 
results are based on a given entire audit configuration, ACx, instead of a single audit 
switch, SX. The set of malicious scenarios detected, SCD, where D MSC SC⊆ . It is 
calculated as the sum of detected scenarios, SCD, divided by the total number of 
malicious scenarios, SCM, in the malicious scenario set for a given audit configuration, 
x TAC AC=∪  { }( )1 2|  , ,..., MT T S S S∈ .  
| |
| |x
D
AC
M
SCCDC
SC
=               (Eq. 3.23) 
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The CDC is an unbiased indicator as to how well a particular Audit 
Configuration, ACx, is at detecting the malicious behaviors contained in a given malicious 
scenario set, SCM. For example, suppose an organization has created a set of 15 malicious 
scenarios in order to determine the effectiveness of its audit configuration. They would 
run each of the scenarios contained in the malicious scenario set, SCM,  and determine 
which of the scenarios in the set are detected. If 13 of the 15 total scenarios are detected, 
the calculation would be: 
| | 13 0.867
| | 15x
D
AC
M
SCCDC
SC
= = =                (Eq. 3.24) 
While CDC is an effective measure of the detection coverage for a given audit 
configuration under a given set of scenarios, it fails to account for the cost in log file size 
and false positives encountered.  
3.11.3.3. Configuration Activity Cost 
As noted earlier, each event, or line in a log file, incurs a cost in terms of disk 
space and needs to be considered for the entire audit configuration. Configuration 
Activity Cost (CAC) is the total activity cost for the current audit configuration, which is 
the sum of all events in the security log for that configuration after the malicious 
scenarios have been executed and the switch CNUC is calculated. It is calculated as the 
sum of the SAC’s for each current audit switch enabled for auditing:  x sAC AC=∪  
{ }( )1 2|  , ,..., Ms s S S S∈ .  
| |  + |
xx
M ACAC
CAC E CNUC=     (Eq. 3.25) 
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For example, suppose an organization has created and executed its set of 15 malicious 
scenarios contained in SCM, and calculated enabled all enabled switches CNUC’s  in 
order to determine the effectiveness of its audit configuration. They currently have 7 
audit switches enabled for auditing (S2, S3, S4, S5, S7, F7, and S8) and their SACs are 322, 
193, 278, 256, 3023, 165, and 54 respectively. The CAC calculation would be: 
322 193 278 256
4291
3023 165 54xAC
CAC
+ + +⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠    (Eq. 3.26) 
3.11.3.4. Configuration Total Activity Cost 
The Configuration Total Activity Cost (CTAC), is identical to the Total Activity 
Cost, TAC, used in the SEM. It is the total number of activity costs for all switches, ST, 
not just the ones enabled in the given audit configuration, ACX. It is the total of all 
switches SAC’s. It is the set of all possible events, or the total of all events for all 
switches, ET, as T xE E=∪   where { }( )1 2| , ,..., Mx x S S S= . It is calculated as the sum of 
the SAC’s for all switches, or the union of all switch total events, ET: 
x
T xAC
CTAC E E= =∪       (Eq. 3.27) 
For example, suppose an organization enabled all switches for auditing, created and 
executed a set of 15 malicious scenarios contained in SCM, and calculated each switches 
CNUC for SCN.  All SAC’s are as follows:  
Switch S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
SAC 1320 543 36 1003 920 45 890 63 0 943 54 5 0 0 31 133 920 0  
The calculation would be: 
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1320 543 36 1003 920
45 890 63 0 943 54 6906
5 0 0 31 133 920 0
xAC
CTAC
+ + + +⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= + + + + + + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + + + + + +⎝ ⎠
   (Eq. 3.28) 
3.11.3.5. Configuration False Positive Count 
Just as with the SEM, the SFPC is a measure of how many critical events 
occurred that did not correspond to a malicious scenario, only for the CEM it’s 
determined for the given audit configuration, ACX. It is calculated as the sum of critical 
events not detecting a malicious scenario that occurred in the log file resulting from the 
set of malicious scenarios, and the CNUC. It is simply a count of events that have the 
same event numbers as detection but are not detections in the SAC. This is not easily 
defineable by set theory: 
For example, suppose an organization evaluating their current audit configuration, ACX, 
created a set of 15 malicious scenarios contained in SCM, calculated all CNUC’s for SCN, 
have 6 audit switches enabled for auditing (S2, F2, S4, S5, S7, and S8), and their SFPCs are 
2, 33, 212, 0, 510, and 0 respectively. The CFPC calculation would be:  
( )2 33 212 0 510 0 757
xAC
CFPC = + + + + + =        (Eq. 3.29) 
3.11.3.6. Configuration Figure of Merit  
In order to evaluate an overall audit configuration’s ability to detect the given 
scenarios so that the optimal auditing template can be determined, the above metrics are 
combined into a single, derived metric: 
1 2 3 x    x  |   x  |x x
x
AC AC
AC
CAC CFPCCFOM W CDC W W
CTAC CAC
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (Eq. 3.30) 
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Just as with the SFOM discussed in section 3.11.2.7, the organization can place 
values into the weights 1W , 2W , and 3W based on its current security requirements. For 
example, suppose an organization evaluating their current audit configuration, ACX, 
created a set of 15 malicious scenarios contained in SCM, calculated all SNUC’s for non-
malicious scenarios in SCN, and have 8 audit switches enabled for auditing (S2, F2, S4, S5, 
F5, S6, S7, and S8). After completing their calculations using the given metrics, they have 
a CDC of .867, a CAC of 4291, a CTAC of 6906, and a CFPC of 757. If they decide that 
detections are very important to them, and costs and false positives are less important and 
they give 1W  a weight of 3, 2W  a weight of 1, and 3W  a weight of 1. The Configuration 
Figure of Merit, CFOM, would be: 
4291 7573 x  (.867)  1   1 1.803
6906 4291xAC
CFOM ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦      (Eq. 3.31) 
If they decide that detections are less important, and lower costs and false 
positives is more important and they give 1W  a weight of 1, 2W  a weight of 3, and 3W  a 
weight of 2. The Configuration Figure of Merit, CFOM, would be: 
4291 7571 x  (.867)  3   2 1.350
6906 4291xAC
CFOM ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦      (Eq. 3.32) 
These two values of 1.803 and -1.350 have no relationship to each other, because 
they are based on different weights. They would be used to compare against other 
CFOM’s which have been calculated using their same weights. Comparisons can only be 
made between configurations if the same weights are used for each configuration. 
Based on the weights for 1W , 2W , and 3W  that an organization decides upon, the 
software calculates the CFOM for all possible audit configurations, and then uses the 
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results to select the 20 audit configurations with the highest CFOM’s. It also displays the 
CFOM that would have resulted from the use of the audit configurations in 1 of 3 security 
templates; NIST EC, NIST SSLF, and NSA SNAC.  
3.11.3.7.   Existing Configuration Evaluation  
The calculations used for the CEM can be used to evaluate a current auditing 
template against an existing audit configuration in a security template (e.g. NIST EC, 
SNAC, etc.), or to compare between two audit configurations. In this experiment, 
Microsoft Excel® is used to input audit configuration data and calculate the resulting 
CFOM. An example of this is performed in Chapter 4, and the spreadsheet can be seen in 
Appendix 3.2. 
3.12. Summary 
The experimental design described in this chapter can be used to create a 
customized insider threat auditing template for a Microsoft Windows XP®. It is used to 
determine how well a Microsoft Windows XP® auditing system can detect particular 
insider threats, using scenarios focused on unique organizational security requirements. 
The approach, auditing system, and evaluation technique were covered. The results of the 
experiment are presented in the next chapter. 
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5. IV. Results 
4.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results of the experimental methodology applied in 
Chapter 3. First, the results of the Switch Evaluation Method (SEM) are analyzed using 
the Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM) to determine which switches achieve the best results 
based on selected scenarios. Second, the results and the Switch Selection Criteria (SSC) 
are used to select an auditing template. Using the Configuration Evaluation Method 
(CEM) the auditing template is subsequently compared to audit configurations from the 
following security templates:  (1) National Institute of Standards and Technology’s 
(NIST) Enterprise Client Security Template (NIST EC), (2) NIST ‘s Specialized Security 
Limited Functionality Security Template (NIST SSLF), and (3) National Security Agency 
Systems and Network Attack Center’s Security Template (NSA SNAC) [30, 31]. Finally, 
using the developed software, the CEM’s ability to create an auditing template is 
demonstrated based on the same results of the malicious and non-malicious scenarios 
used in the SEM.  
4.2. Switch Evaluation Method Results 
The Switch Evaluation Method (SEM) results are presented in this section. The 
SEM gives the information owner the ability to create an auditing template using the 
individual Switch Figures of Merit (SFOM), and the Switch Selection Criteria (SSC). All 
results used to calculate the SFOM are presented, as well as the final SFOM results and 
the final resulting auditing template. This auditing template is then compared with the 
 67 
audit configuration of the following security templates:  (1) NIST EC, (2) NIST SSLF, and 
(3) NSA SNAC. 
4.2.1. Detections 
Detections consist of the events that are present in the security log that identify a 
malicious action after the set of malicious scenarios is simulated. As seen in Table 4.1 
and Figure 4.1, of the 18 malicious scenarios 17 were detected. The detections are in bold 
to indicate which switch detected each particular scenario. When the malicious scenarios 
are listed, the “a” represents the misuse of administrator privileges, and the “u” represents 
normal user privileges. The detailed malicious scenario results can be found in Appendix 
D.  
Based on the results, here are some notable findings: 
1. Scenario 11u is the only scenario not detected.   
2. Switch S5 has the greatest number of detected scenarios with 7 
3. Switch S2 has the second most detections with 6 
4. Switches S1, S4, F5, S8, and S9 has the third most detections with 3 each.  
5.  There were several scenarios detected by single switches:   
a. Scenarios 5a, 6a, 7a, and 8a are only detected by switch S2. 
b. Scenarios 2a, 3a, 9a, 12u, 14a, and 15a are only detected by switch S5. 
c. Scenarios 4a, 10a, and 13u are only detected by switch F5. 
d. Scenario 17u is only detected by switch S9. 
e. Scenario 18u is only detected by switch S8. 
6. There were several scenarios detected by multiple switches: 
a. Scenarios 1a, 15a, and 16u are all detected by both switches, S1 and S4. 
b. Scenarios 1a and 15a are both detected by switches S1, S2, S4, S5, S6, 
S7, S8, and S9. 
7. There are several switches that didn’t detect any of the scenarios: 
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a. Switches F1, F2, S3, F3, F4, F7, F8, and F9 detected no scenarios. 
Table 4.1:  Total Detections By Switch, and Scenario Detection Coverage 
Scenarios S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
1a 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 2 0 Yes
2a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 Yes
3a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 Yes
4a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 108 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Yes
5a 1 7 2 0 0 0 6 6 86 0 0 0 1 0 35 0 0 0 Yes
6a 3 7 6 0 0 0 11 7 21 0 0 0 11 0 88 0 0 0 Yes
7a 2 8 1 0 0 0 7 8 33 0 0 0 10 0 47 0 0 0 Yes
8a 0 1 1 0 0 0 9 2 17 0 0 0 10 0 46 0 0 0 Yes
9a 3 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 6 0 0 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 Yes
10a 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 Yes
11u 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 0 0 0 No
12u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 Yes
13u 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 108 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 Yes
14a 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 76 78 0 0 13 0 22 0 0 0 Yes
15a 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 1 0 6 0 13 0 1 0 Yes
16u 1 4 0 0 0 0 9 4 12 3 1 0 39 0 40 0 28 0 Yes
17u 2 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 73 0 12 0 22 0 36 7 16 0 Yes
18u 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 11 0 8 0 30 0 0 0 Yes
Total Detects 3 0 6 0 0 0 3 0 7 3 1 0 1 0 3 0 3 0 17/18
Switches (Categories)
 
 
4.2.2. Analysis of Detections 
As Table 4.1 indicates, Switch S5 detected a large number of the scenarios. This is 
mainly because S5 audits for successful object access, and most of the scenarios were 
based on the premise of attempting to access other users files. Switch S2 detected a large 
number of scenarios also, mainly the ones in which administrator privileges were 
misused in some way. This switch audits successful account management in which 
accounts are created or changed, and is very useful to audit the actions of system 
administrators to ensure they are abiding by organization security policy. A few of the 
scenarios were detected by several switches, and most likely the switches with the best 
SFOM value will be selected, and the others not selected for the auditing template. 
Several switches did not log anything at all, and after being considered by the 
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organization, the decision will most likely be to not use them in the auditing template. 
Decisions to include switches based on these detection findings are based on the 
organizations Switch Selection Criteria (SSC). 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
Switches
D
et
ec
ts
 
Figure 4.1: Scenario Detections By Switch 
4.2.3. Costs 
Costs are obstructions to identifying the events that indicate a malicious act. They 
are events captured that are not indicative of a malicious act. They conceal and obfuscate 
the events necessary to identify a malicious act. They consist of Activity Costs (AC), and 
False Positive Events (FPE). 
4.2.3.1. Malicious Scenario Activity Cost 
The Malicious Scenario Activity Costs (MSAC) is the total number of events 
logged upon completion of simulating the malicious scenarios. As indicated by Table 4.2, 
there is a wide variety of scenario activity costs.  
Here are some notable findings: 
1. Switch S5 has the highest Scenario Activity Cost at 461 events. 
2. Switch S8 has the second highest Scenario Activity Cost at 409 events. 
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3. Switch F5 has the third highest Scenario Activity Cost at 298 events. 
4. There are several switches with no Scenario Activity Cost: 
a. Switches F2, S3, F3, F7, and F9 have no Scenario Activity Cost. 
Table 4.2:  Scenario Activity Costs and Calculated Normal User Costs 
S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
Malicious Scenario Activity Cost (MSAC ) 17 33 12 0 0 0 95 32 461 298 26 0 130 0 409 7 47 0
NU Cost (15 minutes) 1 0 0 0 3 1 3 1 3 7 0 0 1 0 86 2 0 0
CNUC  (40 hour week) = (NU Cost * 160) 160 0 0 0 480 160 480 160 480 1120 0 0 160 0 13760 320 0 0
SAC  = (MSAC  + CNUC ) 177 33 12 0 480 160 575 192 941 1418 26 0 290 0 14169 327 47 0  
 
4.2.3.2. Calculated Normal User Cost 
The Calculated Normal User Cost (CNUC) is a representative of a weeks worth of 
non-malicious normal user activities. It is the total number of events logged after running 
the 15 minutes of non-malicious “normal user” behavior, multiplied by 160 to represent a 
week. As indicated by Table 4.2, once calculated there is noticeable range of Calculated 
Normal User Costs (CNUC). Here are some notable findings: 
1. Switch S8 has the highest CNUC at 13,760 events. 
2. Switch F5 has the second highest CNUC at 1,120 events. 
3. Switches S3, S4, and S5 have the third highest CNUC at 480 events. 
4. There are several switches with no CNUC: 
b. Switches F1, S2, F2, S6, F6, F7, S9, and F9 have no CNUC. 
4.2.3.3. Switch Activity Cost 
The Switch Activity Cost (SAC) is the total number of events that appear in the 
security log after running the malicious scenarios (MSAC) as well as all calculated non-
malicious normal user events (CNUC). It is calculated as the sum of the MSAC and the 
CNUC. Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 indicates that the Switch Activity Costs (SAC) were 
extremely high in one switch, and significantly high in a couple others.  
Here are the notable findings: 
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1. Switch S8 has the highest SAC at 14,169 events. 
2. Switch S8 has the second highest SAC at 1,418 events. 
3. Switch F5 has the third highest SAC at 941 events. 
4. Switches F2, F6, F7 and F9 have no SAC. 
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Figure 4.2:  Switch Activity Cost (SAC) 
4.2.3.4. Switch False Positive Count 
False positives are events that appear to detect a malicious scenario because they 
have the same event number, but after evaluating them further it is determined that they 
do not. The Switch False Positive Count (SFPC) is the total number of false positives in 
the malicious scenarios and the CNUC. It is calculated as the sum of the malicious 
scenarios false positives and the CNUC false positives. As indicated by Table 4.3 and 
Figure 4.3, the range of Switch False Positive Counts (SFPC) closely resembles the range 
of SAC’s.   
Here are the notable findings: 
1. Switch S8 has the highest SFPC at 6,296 events. 
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2. Switch F5 has the second highest SFPC at 1,130 events. 
3. Switch S4 has the third highest SFPC at 350 events. 
4. Switches S1, F1, S3, F3, S6, F6, F7, F8, S9, and F9 have no SFPC. 
Table 4.3:  Switch False Positive Count 
S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
Scenario False Alarms 0 0 2 0 0 0 30 28 27 10 0 0 7 0 216 0 0 0
NU False Alarms(15 mins) 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 7 0 0 1 0 38 0 0 0
NU False Alarms(40 hr wk) = (NU FA's * 160) 0 0 0 0 0 0 320 160 160 1120 0 0 160 0 6080 0 0 0
CFPC  = (Scen FA + NU FA (40 hr wk)) 0 0 2 0 0 0 350 188 187 1130 0 0 167 0 6296 0 0 0  
 
4.2.3.5. Analysis of Costs and False Positives 
As indicated by Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2, several of the switches had noticeably 
higher Switch Activity Costs (SAC) than the other switches, such as switches S8 and F5. 
Based upon this, depending on the number of detections that switch had (which will 
become evident in the SFOM), the organization may decide that it is not worth the cost to 
enable these switches. Consider switch S8 for example. It is the only switch that detected 
scenario 18u, which is a user running a rootkit, but at an extremely large cost. Switch S8 
audits for successful startup and shutdown of processes. This enabled it to detect the 
process startup of the rootkit, but in order for this switch to be successfully implemented 
by an organization, a list of all authorized processes would need to be compared with the 
processes logged on a workstation, which is unfeasible.  The organization’s SSC, as well 
as the switches SFOM would assist in their decision to include it or not in their auditing 
template. 
 
 73 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
Switches
SF
PC
 
Figure 4.3:  Switch False Positive Counts (SFPC’s) 
 
   
The Switch False Positive Count (SFPC) was noticeably larger for several of the 
same switches that had the larger SAC’s, like S8 and F5. This makes these switches even 
less appealing to the organization, and would perhaps not be selected for their auditing 
template based on their SSC. 
4.2.3.6. Switch Figure of Merit 
The Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM) is calculated by using the formula presented 
in Chapter 3, as seen below: 
1 2 3* * *
CURRENTAuditSwitch
SAC SFPCS FOM W SDC W W
TAC SAC
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
An organization assigns weights to 1W , 2W , and 3W , based upon their security 
requirements and calculates a per switch SFOM. This SFOM in addition to the SSC help 
the information owner design an auditing template. When comparing the SFOM’s to one 
another, the higher the SFOM the better. Depending on the weights used for  1W , 2W , 
and 3W , the SFOM values can be negative. In comparing two negative SFOM’s, the least 
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negative value is greater, and will be the one to select between the two. In the last 
chapter, all Switch Figures of Merit (SFOM) were calculated using a Microsoft Excel 
Spreadsheet. A sample weight of  1W =5, 2W =1, 3W =1 is used to simulate a simulated 
security concern for a notional organization. After assigning the weights, the resulting  
SFOM’s are calculated and provided in Table 4.4.   
Table 4.4:  Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM), and Values used to Calculate Them 
SAC/TAC SFPC/SAC SFOM
S1 0.0093914 0 0.823941918
F1 0.0017509 0 -0.001750942
S2 0.0006367 0.16666667 1.499363294
F2 0 0 0
S3 0.0254682 0 -0.025468244
F3 0.0084894 0 -0.008489415
S4 0.0305088 0.60869565 0.194128847
F4 0.0101873 0.97916667 -0.989353964
S5 0.0499284 0.19872476 1.695791313
F5 0.0752374 0.79689704 -0.038801143
S6 0.0013795 0 0.554176026
F6 0 0 0
S7 0.0153871 0.57586207 -0.035693578
F7 0 0 0
S8 0.7517907 0.44435034 -0.362807745
F8 0.0173502 0 -0.017350241
S9 0.0024938 0 0.830839568
F9 0 0 0
SDC
0.166666667
0
0.333333333
0
0
0
0.166666667
0
0.388888889
0.166666667
0.111111111
0
0.111111111
0
0.166666667
0
0.166666667
0  
 
4.2.3.7. Analysis of Switch Figures of Merit 
    As indicated by Table 4.4, switch S5 has the highest SFOM, followed by S2 and 
S9. These SFOM’s will be used if needed for decision making by the information owner 
for creating an auditing template. Switches with zero values are the results of no 
detections for that switch. 
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4.2.3.8. Determining the Best Auditing Template 
The best auditing template is created using the Switch Selection Criteria (SSC) 
and referring to Table 4.1 as well as the SFOM values in Table 4.4. The resulting auditing 
template is presented in Table 4.5. In accordance with the SSC, the switches are selected 
as follows: 
1. Each switch that is the only switch to detect any given scenario, is enabled for 
auditing.  This was the case with switches S2, S5, F5, S8, and S9. 
2. Each set of switches that detect the same scenarios are analyzed by their 
SFOM value, and the one with the highest value is selected for auditing and 
the others are not.  S1 and S4 both detected scenarios 1a, 15a, and 16u. S1 has 
a SFOM value of 0.8239 and S4 has a SFOM  value of 0.1941.  S4 has a 
higher SFOM so it is selected for audit, and S4 is not. S6 and S7 also detected 
scenarios 1a and 15a, and since S1, S5, and S8 also detect those scenarios and 
they were selected using criteria number 1, so S6 and S7 are not selected. 
3. All remaining switches that do not detect any scenarios are not selected for 
auditing. 
Table 4.5:  Selected Audit Template 
SFOM Selected Audit Template
S1 0.82394 Audit
F1 -0.00175 No Audit
S2 1.49936 Audit
F2 0.00000 No Audit
S3 -0.02547 No Audit
F3 -0.00849 No Audit
S4 0.19413 No Audit
F4 -0.98935 No Audit
S5 1.69579 Audit
F5 -0.03880 Audit
S6 0.55418 No Audit
F6 0.00000 No Audit
S7 -0.03569 No Audit
F7 0.00000 No Audit
S8 -0.36281 Audit
F8 -0.01735 No Audit
S9 0.83084 Audit
F9 0.00000 No Audit
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 1, Automatically selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 2 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 1, Automatically selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 1, Automatically selected
Followed Criteria 1, Automatically selected
Followed Criteria 2 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 2 and was NOT selected
Criteria Followed
Followed Criteria 2 and was selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 1, Automatically selected
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4.2.3.9.   Configuration Comparison 
Now that an auditing template has been created using the SEM, it is evaluated 
using the Configuration Figure of Merit (CFOM) and compared with existing audit 
configurations. Using Microsoft Excel®, all CFOM calculations are performed and the 
newly created  auditing template is compared with 3 preexisting audit configurations in 
security templates; NIST EC, NIST SSLF, and NSA SNAC. Based on the same sample 
weight used for the switch evaluation of 1W =5, 2W =1, and 3W =1, each configuration is 
calculated. The resulting CFOM values are presented in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.4. It is 
evident that based on the scenarios and the SSC that the custom audit configuration 
performs better than existing configurations. 
Table 4.6:  Results of Audit Configuration Comparison 
Audit Configuration CFOM Value
Created Auditing Template 3.378496594
NIST EC 1.757262389
NIST SSLF 2.25058253
NSA SNAC 2.25058253  
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Figure 4.4:  Comparison of Configuration Figures of Merit 
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4.3. Configuration Evaluation Method Results 
The Configuration Evaluation Method (CEM) is used to create the best audit 
configuration based on an exhaustive comparison of all possible audit configurations 
CFOM values, using a program written in C++ for this experiment . The code can be seen 
in Appendix F. All results from the scenarios, as well as costs are input, just as with the 
Switch Evaluation Method, and the program uses the Configuration Figure of Merit 
(CFOM) calculations to select a list of best audit configurations. Many configurations 
were generated for each weight selected and are too numerous to list. They are provided 
in Appendix E. As seen in Table 4.7, when the weight of 1W =1, 2W =0, and 3W =0, the 
Configuration Detection Coverage (CDC) is the only value of importance in the formula, 
so switches were chosen based solely on the CDC value of 0.994 (17 out of 18 scenarios 
detected). After experimenting with the weights, it is noticed that by giving the weights a 
value of  1W =1, 2W =0.07, and 3W =0, would give enough weight to 2W  for a 
configuration to be selected with a reduced Configuration Activity Cost (CAC) value of 
16,764 while still maintaining the same CDC value. This is an example of how to adjust 
the weights to achieve a lower cost while still maintaining the same detection level. 
When the weights were changed to 1W =1, 2W =0.08, and 3W =0.08, the weights 
associated with CAC and CFPC were raised enough for the custom audit configurations 
to have a significantly lower CAC and CFPC values at the expense of the CDC which 
was lowered to 0.889 (16 out of 18 detections). This shows that when the weights of 2W  
and 3W  were raised enough, one detection was not considered because the cost 
associated with it was too high, but the costs went down significantly. Achieving an 
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acceptable threshold is something that an organization would consider if they wanted to 
significantly reduce costs and false positives at the expense of detections.  
Table 4.7:  Weight Affect on Results for Configuration Evaluation 
W1 W2 W3 CDC CAC CFPC
1 0 0 0.944 17997 8320
1 0.07 0 0.944 16764 7615
1 0.08 0.08 0.889 3595 1319  
 
4.4. Summary 
The two methods differ in their approaches. The Switch Evaluation Method 
(SEM), is based on decision making from the Switch Selection Criteria (SSC) and uses 
the Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM) to assist in making those decisions. It bases the 
SFOM on individual switch statistics. The Configuration Evaluation Method (CEM), uses 
the Configuration Figure of Merit (CFOM) to evaluate each audit configuration possible. 
It is based exclusively on calculations, and needs to be fine tuned to understand the 
impact of adjusting the weights for 1W , 2W , and 3W  based on the selected scenarios. 
Once the weights have been understood, the CEM results in a more thorough evaluation 
of the audit configuration and produces more conclusive results, mainly because it does 
an exhaustive evaluation of each possible configuration. The results from both change 
dramatically based upon the malicious scenarios that are selected for the test. Once each 
method is understood and configured within an organization, they can produce similar 
results. Based on the scenarios selected in this experiment, once the weights were fine-
tuned, the CEM appeared to give a more thorough and complete end result. It is 
recommended that an organization try both methods to determine the one that suits them 
best based upon their specific security guidelines. 
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2. V. Conclusions 
5.1. Chapter Overview  
This chapter summarizes the research efforts and the research goals. First, the 
impact of this research and its utility are discussed. Next, ways that it can be 
implemented and follow on suggestions are proposed. Finally, the chapter ends with a 
discussion of potential future research efforts. 
5.2. Restatement of Research Goal 
The research goal was to develop a methodology for creating a customized insider 
threat auditing template based on unique organizational security requirements. This was 
performed by creating metrics that were used in two separate methods for creating this 
auditing template. 
5.3. Research Impact 
Application of the methodology developed in this research provides an 
organization with a method to optimize its auditing capabilities. This increases the 
organizations capability to detect and identify malicious actions early enough to mitigate 
any potential damages. It can also reduce the workload required to review the audit logs 
by reducing their size. Additionally, it can increase the efficiency of security 
administrators ability to detect malicious activity when reviewing audit logs by 
maximizing the amount of useful information they contain. Finally, it allows an 
organization to be aware of what is being audited within its enterprise network and the 
effectiveness of the ability to detect malicious acts.  
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5.4. Suggested Implementaion 
Rather than rely upon one-size-fits-all auditing configurations available in 
recommended security templates, it is suggested that an organization identify its specific 
insider threat security requirements and use the methodology presented in this research to 
create its own custom auditing template. It is suggested that both methods proposed be 
evaluated by the organization to determine the best method for satisfying those identified 
security requirements. It would be very beneficial for the organization to know what is 
being audited within its organizational workstations and to ensure that the auditing that is 
being performed complies with its security requirements. Because security requirements 
change, it is suggested that once the organization has initiated this methodology into its 
security policy, that it periodically use it to reevaluate its auditing template to ensure that 
it still fits their security needs. What is presented in this research is an example. It is 
suggested that an organization use this example as a baseline and make it as robust as 
possible by creating numerous simulated malicious scenarios and using more accurate 
normal user statistics. The more robust the organization makes this methodology, the 
better the results. The C++ program created for this research is provided in Appendix F, 
and can be modified to give the tailored output that the organization needs to make its 
decisions on an auditing template.  
5.5. Future Research 
There are three areas in which this research can be expanded. The first area of 
future research is to apply the methodology to networked workstations and servers to 
identify and customize auditing of network related communication within an 
organization.  
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A second area is to expand the methodology to other networked systems that 
perform various other roles such as a servers, routers, and switches. By applying the 
methodology in various other capacities, it can achieve an improved awareness of the 
auditing situations in those areas and allows for the optimization of auditing capabilities. 
A third area is in applying the methodology to outside threats. Currently many 
organizations apply auditing configurations available in widely used security templates 
without knowing what they audit for and if they are effective. If this research is applied to 
outside threats then perhaps their auditing can be optimized as well. 
5.6. Summary 
This research provides information owners a methodology for maximizing their 
auditing capabilities within their organization. It provides the groundwork for building an 
auditing template and for evaluating an existing auditing configuration to determine if it 
meets the needs of the organizations identified security requirements. The potential exists 
for the functionality to be used in a wide array of organizations. 
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3. Appendix A:  Simulated Malicious Insider Scenarios 
Table A.1:  Simulated Malicious Insider Scenarios 
1a Attempt to Circumvent Auditing (clear Audit Logs) as Admin 
2a Attempt to access users folder as Admin (Users Folder has no SACL, but file inside does.  Admin has access to folder and file) 
3a Attempt to access a users file successfully as admin with SACL (Admin has access to file, auditing is enabled in SACL) 
4a Attempt to access a users file unsuccessfully as admin with SACL (Admin Does NOT have access to file, auditing is enabled in SACL) 
5a Attempt to access a users file as admin with SACL by changing users password and logging in as the user 
6a Attempt to access a users file as admin by creating an admin account to use to mask attempts 
7a Attempt to access a users file as admin by changing a user account to admin to use to mask attempts 
8a Attempt to access a users file by changing a user account to admin by placing into admin group to use to mask attempts 
9a Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to create a hardlink 
10a Attempt to access a users file as admin with an SACL by attempting to create a hardlink 
11u Attempt to access another users folder as user (Users Folder has no SACL, but file inside does.  Admin has access to folder and file) 
12u Attempt to access another users file as user successfully with SACL (User has access to file, Auditing is enabled in SACL) 
13u Attempt to access another users file as user unsuccessfully with SACL (User does not have access to file, Auditing is enabled in SACL) 
14a Attempt to access a users file as admin with SACL by changing ownership of the file 
15a Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to Change Security Policy 
16u Attempt to guess Admin password by rebooting into safemode and guessing admin password 
17u Access a users file by booting with a boot cd and deleting password 
18u Run a rootkit 
 Note:  a = administrator privilege, u = normal user privilege 
4.  
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5. Appendix B:  Simulated Malicious Insider Scenarios Script 
 
Simulated Malicious Scenarios Script (With Confidentiality a Primary Concern, Attempting to Access 
Another Users files) 
 
Open the folder to save all data for the scenario so that you remember what scenario you're doing 
Log in as Levoy 
Go to Start, Control Panel, Administrative Tools, Local Security Policy, Audit Policy, and Set Appropriate 
Switch to Success and Failure, all others to "No Auditing" 
 
1a.  Attempt to Circumvent Auditing (clear Audit Logs) as Admin 
Clear all audit logs 
 
2a.  Attempt to access users folder as Admin (Users Folder has no SACL, but file inside does.  Admin 
has access to folder and file) 
Browse to "C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\User 2's Documents\User 2.txt" folder, then close it 
 
3a.  Attempt to access a users file successfully as admin with SACL (Admin has access to file, auditing 
is enabled in ACL) 
Browse to C:\User 2 (with Admin and User 4 Access)\User 2.txt, then close it 
 
4a.  Attempt to access a users file unsuccessfully as admin with SACL (Admin Does NOT have access 
to file, auditing is enabled in ACL) 
Browse to C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access), It should say "Access Denied", then click OK 
 
5a.  Attempt to access a users file as admin with SACL by changing users password and logging in as 
the user 
Browse to Control Panel, User Accounts, and Change the Password for User 2 to "password" 
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "User 2" with the new password you changed 
Browse to C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt, then close it 
Log off as "User 2" and back in as "levoy" 
 
6a.  Attempt to access a users file as admin by creating an admin account to use to mask attempts 
Browse to Control Panel, User Accounts, and Create an Account Called "Admin" with Admin privileges 
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "Admin Account" 
Browse to C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt, then close it 
Log off as "Admin Account" and log on as "levoy" 
Delete "Admin" Account and all it's files 
 
7a.  Attempt to access a users file as admin by changing a user account to admin to use to mask 
attempts 
Browse to Control Panel, User Accounts, and Change User 1 Account to have Admin Privileges 
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "User 1" 
Browse to C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt, then close it 
Log off as "User 1" and log on as "levoy" 
 
8a.  Attempt to access a users file by changing a user account to admin by placing into admin group to 
use to mask attempts 
Browse to Control Panel, Administrative tools, Computer management, Local Users and Groups, Groups, 
Administrator, and Add User 3 to the Admin Group 
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "User 3" 
Browse to C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt, then close it 
Log off as "User 3" and log on as "levoy" 
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9a.  Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to create a hardlink 
Open a Dos prompt by going to All Programs, Accessories, Command Prompt 
At the C:\ Prompt Type "fsutil hardlink create test "C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 
2.txt", it should say Hardlink created 
Type edit test, it should say "test" 
 
10a.  Attempt to access a users file as admin with an SACL by attempting to create a hardlink 
Open a Dos prompt by going to All Programs, Accessories, Command Prompt 
At the C:\ Prompt Type "fsutil hardlink create test2 c:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt" 
It should say, "Access Denied" 
 
11u.  Attempt to access another users folder as user (Users Folder has no SACL, but file inside does) 
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "User 4" 
Browse to "C:\Documents and Settings\User 2" folder, then close it 
 
12u.  Attempt to access another users file as user successfully with SACL (User has access to file, 
Auditing is enabled in ACL) 
Browse to C:\User 2 (with Admin and User 4 Access)\User 2.txt, then close it 
 
13u.  Attempt to access another users file as user unsuccessfully with SACL (User does not have access 
to file, Auditing is enabled in ACL) 
Browse to C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access), then click OK 
 
14a.  Attempt to access a users file as admin with SACL by changing ownership of the file 
Log off as "User 4" and log on as "levoy" 
Browse to C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access), right click on it and change ownership to levoy 
Then Go to the same folder, right click, and add levoy to have full access to it. 
Then Browse to C:\User 2 wo Admin Access\User 2.txt, then close it 
 
15a.  Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to Change Security Policy 
Log off as "User 4" and log on as "levoy" 
Go to Start, Control Panel, Administrative Tools, Local Security Policy, Audit Policy, and Set all to "No 
Auditing" 
Attempt to browse to both C:\User 2 (with Admin and User 4 Access)\User 2.txt, and C:\User 2 wo Admin 
Access (for 15a) 
Categories 1 and 3 are not used in workstation, Account logon events and Directory Services 
Save all logs to desktop as .evt and .csv and then drag them to appropriate folder 
Shut Down the VMWare Computer 
Make Sure "Snapshot 1" is loaded 
 
Additional Scenarios 
Log on as levoy, then clear audit log 
 
16u.  Attempt to guess Admin password by rebooting into safemode and guessing admin password 
Reboot virtual machine into safe mode 
Make 3 unsuccessful attempts to log onto the administrator account with the password "pass"  
Make one successful attempt to log onto the administrator account with the password "password" 
Reboot back into normal mode  
 
17u.  Access a users file by booting with a boot cd and deleting password 
Reboot with boot cd in 
Change User 2 password to null 
Reboot without boot cd in and log onto User 2 account 
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Browse to C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access) 
Log off as User 2 
 
18u.  Run a rootkit 
Log on as levoy 
Insert pen drive 
Run furoot 
Eject pendrive 
 
Save all logs to desktop as .evt and .csv and then drag them to appropriate folder 
Shut Down the VMWare Computer 
Make Sure "Snapshot 1" is loaded 
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6. Appendix C:  Simulated Non-malicious Insider (Normal User) Scenarios Script 
 
Note:  This Simulated Non-malicious Insider (Normal User) Script took 
15 minutes to run: 
 Normal User Activity Script       
1. Log off as "levoy" and log on as "User 4"      
2. Open Word        
3. Type the word "text"        
4. Save the document to the desktop      
5. Close Word        
6. Open Excel        
7. Type the word "text" into the first cell      
8. Save the document to the desktop      
9. Close Excel        
10. Open Internet Explorer       
11. Try to browse to a web page        
12. Close Internet Explorer       
13. Open Solitaire and play one hand then exit      
14. Open Media player and play one of the sample songs then exit    
15. Right Click and Create a new text document on the desktop    
16. Right Click and Create a new wave sound on the desktop    
17. Right Click and Create a new bitmap image on the desktop    
18. Delete these 3 files        
19. Right click on the desktop, go to properties, settings, then change the desktop picture and  
preview a screensaver 
20. Insert a CD and browse to a file on it      
21. Eject the CD        
22. Insert a Pen Drive        
23. Right Click on the desktop and create a new word document    
24. Type "text"         
25. Save the document to the desktop      
26. Save the document to the pendrive      
27. Print the document to document image writer and save it to the desktop   
28. Close Word and Compress the file      
29. Eject the Pendrive        
30. Open Paint        
31. Draw a quick picture        
32. Save it to the desktop        
33. Right Click on that picture and zip it to a zip file using "winzip"    
34. Open calculator and perform 72 x 36 =, then exit     
35. Go to Seacrh, for files and folders, and do a search for all files ending in .doc, then .txt  
36. Open Powerpoint and create a blank slide with the word "text" on it and an imported picture  
from the sample pictures folder, close it without saving 
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Appendix D:  Individual Scenario Results 
 
In this Appendix the individual results of each scenario are explained.  In each 
figure, the item in bold with a shaded box was where the detection of the malicious act 
occurred.   
1. Scenario 1a:  Attempt to Circumvent Auditing (Clear Audit Logs), as Admin 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a malicious user attempting 
to cover his tracks by deleting any detection of the malicious acts that he 
performed.  It is usually one of the last actions a malicious user performs.  In this 
scenario, a user with administrator rights (username: levoy) attempts to delete the 
audit logs, from within Eventviewer.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for policy change will be 
logged.  This is expected to be an event 517 in the system events category (S9). 
Table A1: Results of Scenario 1a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
1a 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 2 0 Yes  
 
Results:  An event 517 was logged in all of the categories (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, 
S7, S8, and S9).[Figure 4.5]  It can be determined by the event 517 that the audit 
log was cleared by user “levoy” at 12:09:13 AM on 4/9/06.   The event itself can be 
found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number. 
Discussion: This event was easy to determine since it is logged in every category, 
and there are no other events logged for the scenario in most categories.  This 
would be a very important event to notice, because it is rare for the security audit 
logs to be deleted under normal circumstances and it is very frequently used by a 
malicious to cover tracks.  It may not show any information about what occurred 
prior to the deletion of the audit logs, but it is worth looking onto the reason that it 
was performed. 
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2. Scenario 2a:  Attempt to access another users folder as admin (Users Folder has no 
SACL, but file inside does.  Admin has access to folder and file) 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious user 
attempting to browse to another users “My Documents” folder on a shared 
workstation.  While this may simply be a case of a user being curious, it could be a 
malicious user trying to gain access to another users important information.  In this 
scenario, it is being performed by user levoy ,who has administrator rights, tries to 
access C:\Documents and Settings\User2\My Documents\User 
2.txt.  By default, Windows XP® limits access to users files located in their 
individual “C:\Documents and Settings\UserXX\My Documents” 
folder to the individual user and the administrator group, and no auditing is enabled 
for successful or failed attempts to access these files.  For this scenario an SACL 
was configured on the file “User 2.txt” to allow access by all users and log 
successful and failed attempts. 
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged.  This is  expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (S5). 
Table A.2:  Results of Scenario 2a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
2a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  A success audit for object access was logged as event 560.  It can be 
determined from the log that user “levoy” accessed “C:\Documents and 
Settings\UserX\My Documents\User 2.txt” on 3/25/2006 at 09:47:39 hours.  The 
event itself can be found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number. 
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” gained access to user 2’s 
file, and that permission was granted because it was logged as a successful attempt 
and was logged as a success audit.  The access to user 2’s “Documents and 
Settings\My Documents” folder was not logged because it was not enabled with 
auditing through an SACL, while access to the file within it called “User 2.txt was 
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audited because it was enabled with an SACL for auditing.  This audit event would 
not usually show up because auditing for user files located in their individual 
“Documents and Settings\My Documents “ folder is not enabled by default.  In this 
case it was enabled for auditing, and the logged access could mean that either the 
user “levoy” simply had specific permission in the SACL to view the file, or that 
they had permission because of being in a group like the administrator group.  In an 
instance like this, the security administrators of an organization need to look deeper 
into the access to determine if it was authorized by the security policy because it 
could be a completely normal occurrence of or a malicious act. 
3. Scenario 3a:  Attempt to access a users file successfully as admin with SACL 
(Admin has access to file, auditing is enabled in SACL) 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious user 
attempting to browse to another users file, which has been configured with a SACL, 
located on a shared workstation.  The SACL controls access to the file as well as 
auditing all successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the file.  In this scenario, 
the user “levoy” who has administrator rights attempts to access “C:\User 2 (with 
Admin and User 4 Access)\User 2.txt” , which has User 2 as an owner and is 
configured to allow access to user levoy, and to log all successful and failed 
attempts to access it.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged.  This is  expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (S5). 
Table A.3:  Results of Scenario 3a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
3a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  A success audit for object access was logged as event 560.  It can be 
determined from the log that user “levoy” accessed “C:\User 2 (with Admin and 
User 4 Access)\User 2.txt” on 3/25/2006 at 09:47:52 hours.  The event itself can be 
found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number. 
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Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” gained access to user 2’s 
file, and that they had permission to do so because it was a successful attempt and 
was logged as a success audit.  This could mean that either the user “levoy” simply 
had specific permission in the SACL to view the file, or that they had permission 
because of being in a group like the administrator group.  In an instance like this, 
the security administrators of an organization need to look deeper into the event to 
determine if it the users access to the file was authorized by the security policy. 
4. Scenario 4a:  Attempt to access a users file unsuccessfully as admin with SACL 
(Admin Does NOT have access to file, auditing is enabled in SACL) 
Description:  This scenario is the same as scenario 3a except the SACL does not 
allow the user levoy access to the file.  In this scenario, the user levoy who has 
administrator access attempts to access “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 
Access)\User 2.txt” in which User 2 is the owner and the file is configured 
without access to the user levoy and to log all successful and failed attempts to 
access it.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a failure audit for object access will be 
logged.  This is expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (F5). 
Table A4.:  Results of Scenario 4a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
4a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 108 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Yes  
Results:  A failure audit for object access was logged as event 560.  It can be 
determined from the log that user “levoy” attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only 
User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on 3/25/2006 at 09:49:47 hours.  The event itself can be 
found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number. 
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted to gain access to 
user 2’s file, and that he/she did not have permission to do so because it was a failed 
attempt that was logged as a failure audit.  In an instance like this, the security 
administrators of an organization need to look deeper into the event to determine 
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why the user attempted to access an unauthorized file and if the event was an 
instance of a simple mistake or a malicious attempt to gain access to an 
unauthorized file. 
5. Scenario 5a:  Attempt to access a users file as admin with SACL by changing users 
password and logging in as the user. 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider 
with administrator rights attempting to gain access to a users file in which he 
doesn’t have access by changing the users password.  In this scenario, the user levoy 
who has administrator access desires to gain access to “C:\User 2 (Only 
User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” and does not have access, so he/she changes 
User 2’s password and then logs on as User 2 to gain access to the file.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for account management will 
be logged.  This is expected to be an event 628 in the account management category 
(S2) showing that an account password was changed. 
Table A.5: Results of Scenario 5a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
5a 1 7 2 0 0 0 6 6 86 0 0 0 1 0 35 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  A success audit for account management was logged as event 628.  It can 
be determined from the log that user “levoy” changed the password for  the “User 
2” acount on 3/25/2006 at 7:44:01 PM.  Two secondary events that can be used to 
determine the entire evolution of events are event 528 that shows that after the 
password was changed, the “User 2” account was logged onto, and event 560 that 
shows that the file “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” was then accessed 
by User 2.  
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted to gain access to 
user 2’s file by changing the password to the account, and then logged onto it and 
gained access to it’s files.  While this approach to gaining access to a users files is 
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less likely than taking ownership of the files(scenario 14a), it is still a possibility. 
The organization security policy should specify a way of accounting for 
administrator actions such as resetting a password, so that legitimate administrator 
duties can be determined from potential malicious actions. 
6. Scenario 6a:  Attempt to access a users file as admin by creating an admin account 
to use to mask attempts 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider 
with administrator rights attempting to gain access to a user’s file in which he 
doesn’t have access.  He/she will attempt to create an account with administrator 
privileges to mask attempts to gain access to the user’s file.  In this scenario, the 
user levoy who has administrator rights desires to gain access “C:\Documents 
and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt” and does not have 
access, so he/she creates an account with administrator rights with the username 
admin, and then logs on to that account to gain access to the file.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for account management will 
be logged.  This is expected to be an event 628 in the account management category 
(S2) showing that an account was created. 
Table A.6: Results of Scenario 6a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
6a 3 7 6 0 0 0 11 7 21 0 0 0 11 0 88 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  A success audit for account management was logged as event 628.  It can 
be determined from the log that user “levoy” created an account named “admin” on 
3/25/2006 at 7:46:15 PM.  A secondary event that can be used to determine the 
entire evolution of events is event 528 which is the successful logon of the account 
“admin”, followed by the event 560 which is the successful access to the file  
“C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt” by the account 
“admin”.   
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Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted to gain access to 
user 2’s file and mask the effort by creating another administrator account and 
using it to gain access to the file, in an effort to divert attention away from its own 
account.  This would not be a very complicated or likely scenario but still could 
happen and in this case it was logged and relatively easily identified.  Just as all 
other administrator duties, the organization security policy should specify a way of 
accounting for administrator actions such as creating or deleting accounts, so that 
legitimate administrator duties can be determined and separated from potential 
malicious actions. 
7. Scenario 7a:  Attempt to access a users file as admin by changing a user account to 
admin to use to mask attempts 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider 
with administrator rights attempting to gain access to a user’s file in which he 
doesn’t have access.  He/she will attempt to change a normal user account to an 
administrator account to mask attempts to gain access to the user’s file.  In this 
scenario, the user levoy who has administrator access desires to gain access 
“C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt” and does not have 
access, so he/she changes the account User 1, which is a normal user account, to 
have administrator rights and then logs onto that account to gain access to the file.     
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for account management will 
be logged.  This is expected to be an event 636 in the account management category 
(S2) showing that the account “User 1” was changed to have administrator rights. 
Table A.7: Results of Scenario 7a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
7a 2 8 1 0 0 0 7 8 33 0 0 0 10 0 47 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  A success audit for account management was logged as event 636.  It can 
be determined from the log that user “levoy” changed account with ID: S-1-5-21-
484763869-152049171-839522115-1004 (which can be determined to be User 1 
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from event 528, see appendix A) to have administrator privileges on 3/25/2006 at 
7:55:08 PM.  A secondary event that can be used to determine the entire evolution 
of events is event 528 which is the successful logon of the account “User 1”, 
followed by the event 560 which is the successful access to the file  “C:\Documents 
and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt” by the account “User 1”.   
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted to gain access to 
user 2’s file and mask the effort by changing a user account to an administrator 
account and using it to gain access to the file, in an effort to divert attention away 
from its own account.  This would not be a very complicated or likely scenario but 
still could happen and in this case it was logged and relatively easily identified.  
Just as all other administrator duties, the organization security policy should specify 
a way of accounting for administrator actions such as creating or deleting accounts, 
so that legitimate administrator duties can be determined and separated from 
potential malicious actions. 
8. Scenario 8a:  Attempt to access a users file by changing a user account to admin by 
placing into admin group to mask attempts to access users file 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider 
with administrator rights attempting to gain access to a user’s file in which he 
doesn’t have access.  He/she will attempt to change a normal user account to an 
administrator account to mask attempts to gain access to the user’s file.  In this 
scenario, the user levoy who has administrator access desires to gain access to 
“C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 
2.txt” and does not have access, so he/she changes the account User 3, which is a 
normal user account, to have administrator rights by adding it to the administrator 
group and then logs onto that account to gain access to the file. 
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for account management will 
be logged.  This is expected to be an event 636 in the account management category 
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(S2) showing that the account “User 3” was changed to have administrator rights by 
being added to the administrator group. 
Table A.8: Results of Scenario 8a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
8a 0 1 1 0 0 0 9 2 17 0 0 0 10 0 46 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  A success audit for account management was logged as event 636.  It can 
be determined from the log that user “levoy” added account with ID: S-1-5-21-
484763869-152049171-839522115-1006 (which can be determined to be User 3 
from event 528, see appendix A) to the administrator group on 3/25/2006 at 7:57:18 
PM.  A secondary event that can be used to determine the entire evolution of events 
is event 528 which is the successful logon of the account “User 3”, followed by the 
event 560 which is the successful access to the file  “C:\Documents and 
Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt” by the account “User 3”.   
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted to gain access to 
user 2’s file and mask the effort by changing a user account to an administrator 
account and using it to gain access to the file, in an effort to divert attention away 
from its own account.  This would not be a very complicated or likely scenario but 
still could happen and in this case it was logged and relatively easily identified.  
Just as all other administrator duties, the organization security policy should specify 
a way of accounting for administrator actions such as creating or deleting accounts, 
so that legitimate administrator duties can be determined and separated from 
potential malicious actions.  It is also very important for security administrators to 
pay close attention to the members of the administrator group. 
9. Scenario 9a:  Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to create a 
hardlink 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider 
with administrator rights attempting mask attempts to access a users file by creating 
a hard link to a users file from the command prompt.  A hardlink is a link that 
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points to a particular file or directory and has all the same rights as the file itself.  In 
this scenario, the user levoy who has administrator rights desires to gain access to 
“C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt”.   He/she goes to 
the command prompt and types "fsutil hardlink create test "C:\Documents and 
Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt" which will create a hardlink to the file 
"C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt" named “test”.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged.  This is expected to be an event 568 in the object access category (S5) 
showing that a successful attempt to make a hard link was performed. 
   
Table A.9: Results of Scenario 9a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
9a 3 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 6 0 0 0 5 0 12 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  A success audit for object access was logged as event 568.  It can be 
determined from the log that user “levoy” successfully created a hard link to the file 
on 3/25/2006 at 9:59:58 PM.   
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” successfully attempted to 
gain access to user 2’s file by creating a hardlink.  This is common way that 
malicious insiders gain access to files, and then delete the hardlink because if the 
file has an SACL enabled, it will log this event but it will be less noticeable than 
simple access to the file.[add ref].    Event 568 is an event that security 
administrators need to be aware of and look for on a regular basis because it is 
seldom used under normal circumstances.    
10. Scenario 10a:  Attempt to access a users file as admin with an SACL by 
attempting to create a hardlink 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a malicious insider with 
administrator rights attempting to gain access to a user’s file in which he does not 
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have access by attempting to create a hard link to the users file from the command 
prompt.  .  The file has an SACL restricting access to only User 2.  In this scenario, 
the user levoy who has administrator access desires to gain access to the file 
“C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt" and does not have access.  He/she goes 
to the command prompt and types " fsutil hardlink create test2 "c:\User 2 (Only 
User 2 Access)\User 2.txt" which will attempt to create a hardlink to the file "fsutil 
hardlink create test2 "c:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt" named “test2”.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged.  This is expected to be an event 568 in the object access category (S5) 
showing that a successful attempt to make a hard link was performed. 
   
Table A.10: Results of Scenario 10a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
10a 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  A failure audit for object access was logged as event 560.  It can be 
determined from the log that user “levoy” unsuccessfully attempted to created a 
hard link to the file on 3/25/2006 at 10:00:31 PM.   
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” unsuccessfully attempted 
to gain access to user 2’s file by creating a hardlink.  This was an unexpected result.  
Instead of an event 568 failure hardlink attempt, an event 560 failure object access 
was logged.  Just as scenario 9a, this is common way that malicious insiders gain 
access to files, and then delete the hardlink because if the file has an SACL enabled, 
it will log this event but it will be less noticeable than simple access to the file.[add 
ref].    Security administrators need to regularly review audit logs and look for event 
560 failure object access to determine if they are simple mistakes or if a possible 
malicious insider is browsing another users files. 
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11. Scenario 11u:  Attempt to access another users folder as user (Users Folder has 
no SACL, but file inside does have SACL) 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider 
with normal user rights attempting to gain access to another user’s file located in 
their personal “My Documents” folder on a shared workstation.  It would be 
indicative of a user either being curious and browsing files on a workstation, or 
trying to gain access to personal information for malicious reasons.  He/she should 
not be able to browse to this folder because normal users are not allowed into other 
users folders by default.  In this scenario, the user User 4 who has normal user 
access desires to gain access to “C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My 
Documents\User 2.txt".  He/she simply tries to browse to it. 
Expected Results:  It is expected that a failure audit for object access will be 
logged.  This is expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (F5) 
showing that a failed object access attempt was performed. 
   
Table A.11: Results of Scenario 11u 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
11u 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 0 0 0 No  
 
Results:  There was nothing logged for this scenario to indicate what occurred.   
Discussion:  Since normal user access to other users “C:\Documents and 
Settings\User XX\My Documents” folder is not allowed by default on Windows 
XP®, the user in this scenario was blocked from gaining access to this folder.  Also 
by default there is nothing logged for attempts to gain access, so there was no 
evidence of the attempt.  Even though the file “User 2.txt” itself was enabled for 
auditing, the folder “My Documents” was not.  If an organizations security 
administrators want to know if there are failed or successful attempts to gain access 
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to other users files then they need to enable auditing on those files and have an 
SACL on them as well. 
12. Scenario 12u:  Attempt to access another users file as user successfully with 
SACL (User has access to file, Auditing is enabled in SACL) 
Description:  This scenario is representative of a possible malicious user with 
normal user rights attempting to browse to another users file on a shared 
workstation.  The file has been configured with an SACL, which controls access to 
the file as well as auditing all successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the 
file.  In this scenario, the user “User 4” who has normal user rights attempts to 
access the file “C:\User 2 (with Admin and User 4 Access)\User 2.txt” which User 
2 is an owner.  The file is configured to allow access to user “User 4”, and to log all 
successful and failed attempts to access it.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged.  This is  expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (S5). 
Table A.12: Results of Scenario 12u 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
12u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  A success audit for object access was logged as event 560.  It can be 
determined from the log that user “User 4” accessed “C:\User 2 (with Admin and 
User 4 Access)\User 2.txt” on 3/25/2006 at 10:01:52 hours.  The event itself can be 
found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number. 
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “User 4” gained access to user 2’s 
file, and that they had permission to do so because it was a successful attempt and 
was logged as a success audit.  This could mean that either the user “User 4” simply 
had specific permission in the SACL to view the file, or that they had permission 
because of being in a group like the administrator group.  In an instance like this, 
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the security administrators of an organization need to look deeper into the event to 
determine if it the users access to the file was authorized by the security policy. 
13. Scenario 13u:  Attempt to access another users file as user unsuccessfully with 
SACL (User does not have access to file, Auditing is enabled in SACL) 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a malicious user with 
normal user rights attempting to browse to another users file on a shared 
workstation.  The file has been configured with an SACL, which controls access to 
the file as well as auditing all successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the 
file.  In this scenario, the user “User 4” who has normal user rights attempts to 
access the file “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt”,  in which User 2 is the 
owner and the file is configured to not allow access to “User 4”, and to log all 
successful and failed attempts to access it.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a failure audit for object access will be 
logged.  This is  expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (F5). 
 
Table A.13: Results of Scenario 13u 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
13u 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 108 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  A failure audit for object access was logged as event 560.  It can be 
determined from the log that user “User 4” attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only 
User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on 3/25/2006 at 10:01:57 hours.  The event itself can be 
found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number. 
 
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “User 4” attempted to gain access 
to user 2’s file, and that he/she did not have permission to do so because it was a 
failed attempt that was logged as a failure audit.  In an instance like this, the 
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security administrators of an organization need to look deeper into the event to 
determine why the user attempted to access an unauthorized file and if the event 
was an instance of a simple mistake or a malicious attempt to gain access to an 
unauthorized file. 
14. Scenario 14a:  Attempt to access a users file as Admin with SACL by changing 
ownership of the file 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious user 
with administrator rights attempting to gain access to another users file on a shared 
workstation.  The file has been configured with an SACL, which controls access to 
the file as well as auditing all successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the 
file.  In this scenario, the user “levoy” who has administrator rights attempts to 
access the file “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt”,  in which User 2 is the 
owner and it is configured without access to “levoy” and to log all successful and 
failed attempts to access it.  The user “levoy” attempts to gain access by taking 
ownership of the file and giving himself access to it. 
Expected Results:  It is expected that most likely initially a failure audit for object 
access will be logged as user “levoy” tries to access the file as an event 560 in the 
object access category (F5).  Then it is expected that a success audit for object 
access will be logged as an event 560 with the take ownership privilege 
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) indicated in the privileges section.   
Table A.14: Results of Scenario 14a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
14a 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 76 78 0 0 13 0 22 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  The primary audit log indication was a success audit indicating object 
access with the take ownership privilege (SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) used in the 
object access category (S5).  Secondary audit log indications show that a failure 
audit for object access was logged as event 560 prior to the take ownership 
privilege being exercised in the object access category (F5).  Another secondary 
 102 
audit log indication was that the take ownership privilege 
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) was exercised was logged as event 578 in the 
privilege use category.  It can be determined from the logs that “levoy” 
unsuccessfully attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on 
3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours, then used the take ownership privilege to take 
ownership of the file and accessed it on 3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours.  The events 
can be found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number. 
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted unsuccessfully 
to gain access to user 2’s file first, and then took ownership of the file and gave 
himself access.  This scenario requires close evaluation of the event 560 audit logs 
to determine that the take ownership privilege was used.  If the confidentiality of 
particular files on workstations is a concern of the organization, then SACL’s should 
be put on those files and auditing should be enabled for success in the category 
object access.  Potential abuse of administrator privileges such as what occurred in 
this scenario is why auditing should be used to keep an eye on administrators to 
ensure that they are abiding by the organizations security policy. 
15. Scenario 15a:  Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to change 
the Security Policy 
Description:  This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious user 
with administrator rights disabling all auditing by changing the local security policy 
to mask attempts to gain access to another users file on a shared workstation.  The 
file has been configured with an SACL, which controls access to the file as well as 
auditing all successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the file.  In this scenario, 
the user “levoy” who has administrator rights disables auditing to mask his/her 
attempts to access the file “C:\User 2 (With Admin and User 4)\User 2.txt”,  in 
which User 2 is the owner and it is configured to allow access to “levoy” and to log 
all successful and failed attempts to access it.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged as user “levoy” tries to access the file as an event 560 in the object access 
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category (F5).  Then it is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged as an event 560 with the take ownership privilege 
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) indicated in the privileges section.   
Table A.15: Results of Scenario 15a 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
15a 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 5 0 1 0 6 0 13 0 1 0 Yes  
 
Results:  This scenario is representative of a possible malicious user with normal 
user rights attempting to elevate privileges to administrator by rebooting the 
computer into safe mode and trying to guess the password to the administrator 
account.  The administrator account, if not removed or renamed, is created at the 
time of installing Windows XP®.  It is a way of logging into the workstation in safe 
mode, and there is no limit to the number of failed attempts to try to log into it.  In 
this scenario, a user will reboot the virtual machine and make three failed attempts 
to guess the administrator password before getting it right and logging in. 
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted unsuccessfully 
to gain access to user 2’s file first, and then took ownership of the file and gave 
himself access.  This scenario requires close evaluation of the event 560 audit logs 
to determine that the take ownership privilege was used.  If the confidentiality of 
particular files on workstations is a concern of the organization, then SACL’s should 
be put on those files and auditing should be enabled for success in the category 
object access.  Potential abuse of administrator privileges such as what occurred in 
this scenario is why auditing should be used to keep an eye on administrators to 
ensure that they are abiding by the organizations security policy. 
16. Scenario 16a:  Attempt to guess Admin password by rebooting into safemode and 
guessing admin password 
Description:  This scenario is representative of a possible malicious user with 
normal user rights attempting to elevate privileges to administrator by rebooting the 
computer into safe mode and trying to guess the password to the administrator 
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account.  The administrator account, if not removed or renamed, is created at the 
time of installing Windows XP®.  It is a way of logging into the workstation in safe 
mode, and there is no limit to the number of failed attempts to try to log into it.  In 
this scenario, a user will reboot the virtual machine and make three failed attempts 
to guess the administrator password before getting it right and logging in.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged as user “levoy” tries to access the file as an event 560 in the object access 
category (F5).  Then it is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged as an event 560 with the take ownership privilege 
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) indicated in the privileges section.   
Table A.16: Results of Scenario 16u 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
16u 1 4 0 0 0 0 9 4 12 3 1 0 39 0 40 0 28 0 Yes  
 
Results:  The primary audit log indication was a success audit indicating object 
access with the take ownership privilege (SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) used in the 
object access category (S5).  Secondary audit log indications show that a failure 
audit for object access was logged as event 560 prior to the take ownership 
privilege being exercised in the object access category (F5).  Another secondary 
audit log indication was that the take ownership privilege 
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) was exercised was logged as event 578 in the 
privilege use category.  It can be determined from the logs that “levoy” 
unsuccessfully attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on 
3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours, then used the take ownership privilege to take 
ownership of the file and accessed it on 3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours.  The events 
can be found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number. 
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted unsuccessfully 
to gain access to user 2’s file first, and then took ownership of the file and gave 
himself access.  This scenario requires close evaluation of the event 560 audit logs 
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to determine that the take ownership privilege was used.  If the confidentiality of 
particular files on workstations is a concern of the organization, then SACL’s should 
be put on those files and auditing should be enabled for success in the category 
object access.  Potential abuse of administrator privileges such as what occurred in 
this scenario is why auditing should be used to keep an eye on administrators to 
ensure that they are abiding by the organizations security policy. 
17. Scenario 17u:  Access a users file by booting with a bootable cd and deleting 
password 
Description:  This scenario is representative of a possible malicious user with 
normal user rights attempting to gain access to a users file by rebooting the 
computer using a bootable cd, changing the users password, then rebooting and 
gaining access to the users file with the new password. The cd contains a 
Windows® registry editor and boots into a Linux shell.  In this scenario, a user will 
reboot the virtual machine with the bootable cd inserted.  The user will then use the 
Windows® registry editor on the cd to change the “User 2” account to have no 
password.  Then the user will reboot again, log into the “User 2” account, and gain 
access to the “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)” file.   
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged as user “levoy” tries to access the file as an event 560 in the object access 
category (F5).  Then it is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged as an event 560 with the take ownership privilege 
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) indicated in the privileges section.   
Table A.17: Results of Scenario 17u 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
17u 2 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 73 0 12 0 22 0 36 7 16 0 Yes  
 
Results:  The primary audit log indication was a success audit indicating object 
access with the take ownership privilege (SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) used in the 
object access category (S5).  Secondary audit log indications show that a failure 
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audit for object access was logged as event 560 prior to the take ownership 
privilege being exercised in the object access category (F5).  Another secondary 
audit log indication was that the take ownership privilege 
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) was exercised was logged as event 578 in the 
privilege use category.  It can be determined from the logs that “levoy” 
unsuccessfully attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on 
3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours, then used the take ownership privilege to take 
ownership of the file and accessed it on 3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours.  The events 
can be found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number. 
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted unsuccessfully 
to gain access to user 2’s file first, and then took ownership of the file and gave 
himself access.  This scenario requires close evaluation of the event 560 audit logs 
to determine that the take ownership privilege was used.  If the confidentiality of 
particular files on workstations is a concern of the organization, then SACL’s should 
be put on those files and auditing should be enabled for success in the category 
object access.  Potential abuse of administrator privileges such as what occurred in 
this scenario is why auditing should be used to keep an eye on administrators to 
ensure that they are abiding by the organizations security policy. 
18. Scenario 18u:  Run a rootkit 
Description:  This scenario is representative of a possible malicious user with 
normal user rights attempting to elevate privileges by running a rootkit.  In this 
scenario, user “levoy” will insert a pen drive with a rootkit executable file on it.  
The rootkit is called “Fu_Rootkit”, and is a common way of inserting a backdoor 
into a workstation to enable enumeration at a later time.  The user “levoy” will then 
run the executable “fu.exe” which will install the rootkit, eject the pen drive, and 
log off. 
Expected Results:  It is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
logged as user “levoy” tries to access the file as an event 560 in the object access 
category (F5).  Then it is expected that a success audit for object access will be 
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logged as an event 560 with the take ownership privilege 
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) indicated in the privileges section.   
Table A.18: Results of Scenario 18u 
Scenario S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
18u 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 11 0 8 0 30 0 0 0 Yes  
 
Results:  The primary audit log indication was a success audit indicating object 
access with the take ownership privilege (SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) used in the 
object access category (S5).  Secondary audit log indications show that a failure 
audit for object access was logged as event 560 prior to the take ownership 
privilege being exercised in the object access category (F5).  Another secondary 
audit log indication was that the take ownership privilege 
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) was exercised was logged as event 578 in the 
privilege use category.  It can be determined from the logs that “levoy” 
unsuccessfully attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on 
3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours, then used the take ownership privilege to take 
ownership of the file and accessed it on 3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours.  The events 
can be found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number. 
Discussion:  This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted unsuccessfully 
to gain access to user 2’s file first, and then took ownership of the file and gave 
himself access.  This scenario requires close evaluation of the event 560 audit logs 
to determine that the take ownership privilege was used.  If the confidentiality of 
particular files on workstations is a concern of the organization, then SACL’s should 
be put on those files and auditing should be enabled for success in the category 
object access.  Potential abuse of administrator privileges such as what occurred in 
this scenario is why auditing should be used to keep an eye on administrators to 
ensure that they are abiding by the organizations security policy. 
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7. Appendix E:  CEM Method Output from the Program Written in C++ 
 
The Configuration Evaluation Method (CEM) is used to create an optimal audit 
configuration based on an exhaustive comparison of all possible audit configurations, 
using a program written in C++ for this experiment.  The program’s output can be seen 
below: 
1.  The output using weights of 1W =1, 2W =0, and 3W =0: 
Reading cost.csv file......done. 
Reading primary.csv file......done. 
Reading secondary.csv file......done. 
 
W1 = 1.0000 W2 = 0.0000 W3 = 0.0000 
 
Per Switch Calculations: 
Switch:  0 DC: 0.1667 AC:   177 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0094 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  1 DC: 0.0000 AC:    33 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0018 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  2 DC: 0.3333 AC:    12 FPC:     2 AC/TC: 0.0006 FPC/AC: 0.1667 
Switch:  3 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  4 DC: 0.0000 AC:   480 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0255 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  5 DC: 0.0000 AC:   160 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0085 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  6 DC: 0.1667 AC:   575 FPC:   350 AC/TC: 0.0305 FPC/AC: 0.6087 
Switch:  7 DC: 0.0000 AC:   192 FPC:   188 AC/TC: 0.0102 FPC/AC: 0.9792 
Switch:  8 DC: 0.3889 AC:   941 FPC:   187 AC/TC: 0.0499 FPC/AC: 0.1987 
Switch:  9 DC: 0.1667 AC:  1418 FPC:  1130 AC/TC: 0.0752 FPC/AC: 0.7969 
Switch: 10 DC: 0.1111 AC:    26 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0014 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 11 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 12 DC: 0.1111 AC:   290 FPC:   167 AC/TC: 0.0154 FPC/AC: 0.5759 
Switch: 13 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 14 DC: 0.1667 AC: 14169 FPC:  6296 AC/TC: 0.7518 FPC/AC: 0.4444 
Switch: 15 DC: 0.0000 AC:   327 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0174 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 16 DC: 0.1667 AC:    47 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0025 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 17 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
 
NIST EC  SwitchID:28882 
DC: 0.444 AC: 837 AC/TC: 0.044 FPC: 352 FPC/AC: 0.421 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.444444 
Switches on: S1 S2 S4 S6 S9 
Total Switches On: 5 
 
NIST SSLF SwitchID:3CD92 
DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.611111 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F7 S9 
Total Switches On: 10 
 
SNAC      SwitchID:3CDD3 
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DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.611111 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F6 F7 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 12 
 
Top Ten Switches based upon W1=1.000000 W2=0.000000 W3=0.000000: 
 
Switch Rank:  1 SwitchID:08B0A 
DC: 0.944 AC: 17162 AC/TC: 0.911 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.464 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.944444 
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S8 S9 
Total Switches On: 6 
 
Switch Rank:  2 SwitchID:08B0B 
DC: 0.944 AC: 17162 AC/TC: 0.911 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.464 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.944444 
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 7 
 
Switch Rank:  3 SwitchID:08B0E 
DC: 0.944 AC: 17489 AC/TC: 0.928 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.455 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.944444 
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S8 F8 S9 
Total Switches On: 7 
 
Switch Rank:  4 SwitchID:08B0F 
DC: 0.944 AC: 17489 AC/TC: 0.928 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.455 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.944444 
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S8 F8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 8 
 
Switch Rank:  5 SwitchID:08B1A 
DC: 0.944 AC: 17162 AC/TC: 0.911 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.464 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.944444 
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 F7 S8 S9 
Total Switches On: 7 
 
Switch Rank:  6 SwitchID:08B1B 
DC: 0.944 AC: 17162 AC/TC: 0.911 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.464 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.944444 
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 F7 S8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 8 
 
Switch Rank:  7 SwitchID:08B1E 
DC: 0.944 AC: 17489 AC/TC: 0.928 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.455 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.944444 
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 F7 S8 F8 S9 
Total Switches On: 8 
 
Switch Rank:  8 SwitchID:08B1F 
DC: 0.944 AC: 17489 AC/TC: 0.928 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.455 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.944444 
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 9 
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Switch Rank:  9 SwitchID:08B2A 
DC: 0.944 AC: 17452 AC/TC: 0.926 FPC: 8132 FPC/AC: 0.466 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.944444 
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S7 S8 S9 
Total Switches On: 7 
 
Switch Rank: 10 SwitchID:08B2B 
DC: 0.944 AC: 17452 AC/TC: 0.926 FPC: 8132 FPC/AC: 0.466 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.944444 
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S7 S8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 8 
 
 
2.  The output using weights of 1W =1, 2W =0.07, and 3W =0: 
Reading cost.csv file......done. 
Reading primary.csv file......done. 
Reading secondary.csv file......done. 
 
W1 = 1.0000 W2 = 0.0700 W3 = 0.0000 
 
Per Switch Calculations: 
Switch:  0 DC: 0.1667 AC:   177 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0094 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  1 DC: 0.0000 AC:    33 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0018 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  2 DC: 0.3333 AC:    12 FPC:     2 AC/TC: 0.0006 FPC/AC: 0.1667 
Switch:  3 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  4 DC: 0.0000 AC:   480 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0255 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  5 DC: 0.0000 AC:   160 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0085 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  6 DC: 0.1667 AC:   575 FPC:   350 AC/TC: 0.0305 FPC/AC: 0.6087 
Switch:  7 DC: 0.0000 AC:   192 FPC:   188 AC/TC: 0.0102 FPC/AC: 0.9792 
Switch:  8 DC: 0.3889 AC:   941 FPC:   187 AC/TC: 0.0499 FPC/AC: 0.1987 
Switch:  9 DC: 0.1667 AC:  1418 FPC:  1130 AC/TC: 0.0752 FPC/AC: 0.7969 
Switch: 10 DC: 0.1111 AC:    26 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0014 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 11 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 12 DC: 0.1111 AC:   290 FPC:   167 AC/TC: 0.0154 FPC/AC: 0.5759 
Switch: 13 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 14 DC: 0.1667 AC: 14169 FPC:  6296 AC/TC: 0.7518 FPC/AC: 0.4444 
Switch: 15 DC: 0.0000 AC:   327 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0174 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 16 DC: 0.1667 AC:    47 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0025 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 17 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
 
NIST EC  SwitchID:28882 
DC: 0.444 AC: 837 AC/TC: 0.044 FPC: 352 FPC/AC: 0.421 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.441336 
Switches on: S1 S2 S4 S6 S9 
Total Switches On: 5 
 
NIST SSLF SwitchID:3CD92 
DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.601900 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F7 S9 
Total Switches On: 10 
 
SNAC      SwitchID:3CDD3 
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DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.601900 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F6 F7 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 12 
 
Top Ten Switches based upon W1=1.000000 W2=0.070000 W3=0.000000: 
 
Switch Rank:  1 SwitchID:2830A 
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.882181 
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 S8 S9 
Total Switches On: 6 
 
Switch Rank:  2 SwitchID:2830B 
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.882181 
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 S8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 7 
 
Switch Rank:  3 SwitchID:2831A 
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.882181 
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F7 S8 S9 
Total Switches On: 7 
 
Switch Rank:  4 SwitchID:2831B 
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.882181 
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F7 S8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 8 
 
Switch Rank:  5 SwitchID:2834A 
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.882181 
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F6 S8 S9 
Total Switches On: 7 
 
Switch Rank:  6 SwitchID:2834B 
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.882181 
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F6 S8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 8 
 
Switch Rank:  7 SwitchID:2835A 
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.882181 
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F6 F7 S8 S9 
Total Switches On: 8 
 
Switch Rank:  8 SwitchID:2835B 
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.882181 
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F6 F7 S8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 9 
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Switch Rank:  9 SwitchID:2C30A 
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.882181 
Switches on: S1 S2 F2 S5 F5 S8 S9 
Total Switches On: 7 
 
Switch Rank: 10 SwitchID:2C30B 
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.882181 
Switches on: S1 S2 F2 S5 F5 S8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 8 
 
 
3.  The output using weights of 1W =1, 2W =0.08, and 3W =0.08: 
Reading cost.csv file......done. 
Reading primary.csv file......done. 
Reading secondary.csv file......done. 
 
W1 = 1.0000 W2 = 0.0800 W3 = 0.0800 
 
Per Switch Calculations: 
Switch:  0 DC: 0.1667 AC:   177 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0094 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  1 DC: 0.0000 AC:    33 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0018 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  2 DC: 0.3333 AC:    12 FPC:     2 AC/TC: 0.0006 FPC/AC: 0.1667 
Switch:  3 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  4 DC: 0.0000 AC:   480 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0255 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  5 DC: 0.0000 AC:   160 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0085 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch:  6 DC: 0.1667 AC:   575 FPC:   350 AC/TC: 0.0305 FPC/AC: 0.6087 
Switch:  7 DC: 0.0000 AC:   192 FPC:   188 AC/TC: 0.0102 FPC/AC: 0.9792 
Switch:  8 DC: 0.3889 AC:   941 FPC:   187 AC/TC: 0.0499 FPC/AC: 0.1987 
Switch:  9 DC: 0.1667 AC:  1418 FPC:  1130 AC/TC: 0.0752 FPC/AC: 0.7969 
Switch: 10 DC: 0.1111 AC:    26 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0014 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 11 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 12 DC: 0.1111 AC:   290 FPC:   167 AC/TC: 0.0154 FPC/AC: 0.5759 
Switch: 13 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 14 DC: 0.1667 AC: 14169 FPC:  6296 AC/TC: 0.7518 FPC/AC: 0.4444 
Switch: 15 DC: 0.0000 AC:   327 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0174 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 16 DC: 0.1667 AC:    47 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0025 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
Switch: 17 DC: 0.0000 AC:     0 FPC:     0 AC/TC: 0.0000 FPC/AC: 0.0000 
 
NIST EC  SwitchID:28882 
DC: 0.444 AC: 837 AC/TC: 0.044 FPC: 352 FPC/AC: 0.421 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.407248 
Switches on: S1 S2 S4 S6 S9 
Total Switches On: 5 
 
NIST SSLF SwitchID:3CD92 
DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.546713 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F7 S9 
Total Switches On: 10 
 
SNAC      SwitchID:3CDD3 
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DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.546713 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F6 F7 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 12 
 
Top Ten Switches based upon W1=1.000000 W2=0.080000 W3=0.080000: 
 
Switch Rank:  1 SwitchID:3B386 
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.844378 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F8 S9 
Total Switches On: 10 
 
Switch Rank:  2 SwitchID:3B387 
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.844378 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 11 
 
Switch Rank:  3 SwitchID:3B396 
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.844378 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F7 F8 S9 
Total Switches On: 11 
 
Switch Rank:  4 SwitchID:3B397 
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.844378 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F7 F8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 12 
 
Switch Rank:  5 SwitchID:3B3C6 
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.844378 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F6 F8 S9 
Total Switches On: 11 
 
Switch Rank:  6 SwitchID:3B3C7 
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.844378 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F6 F8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 12 
 
Switch Rank:  7 SwitchID:3B3D6 
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.844378 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F6 F7 F8 S9 
Total Switches On: 12 
 
Switch Rank:  8 SwitchID:3B3D7 
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.844378 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F6 F7 F8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 13 
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Switch Rank:  9 SwitchID:3F386 
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.844378 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F8 S9 
Total Switches On: 11 
 
Switch Rank: 10 SwitchID:3F387 
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM: 
0.844378 
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F8 S9 F9 
Total Switches On: 12 
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8. Appendix F:  C++ Code for CFOM Program Written for this Experiment  
 
#include "stdafx.h" 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <math.h> 
#include <string.h> 
 
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) 
{ 
   char CostLine[18][100]; 
   char PrimaryLine[18][100]; 
   char SecondaryLine[18][100]; 
   char *Value[19]; 
   char *fp; 
   char line[120]; 
   char *p; 
   unsigned int Cost[18][18]; 
   unsigned int Primary[18][18]; 
   unsigned int Secondary[18][18]; 
   unsigned int RowSum[18]; 
   unsigned int ColSum[18]; 
   unsigned char i; 
   unsigned char j; 
   unsigned char detected; 
   float sdc[18]; 
   unsigned int sac[18]; 
   unsigned int sfpc[18];    
   float dc; 
   unsigned int ac; 
   unsigned int fpc[18]; 
   unsigned int tfpc; 
   unsigned long Top20Switches[21]; 
   float Top20DC[21]; 
   unsigned int Top20AC[21]; 
   unsigned int Top20FPC[21]; 
   float Top20FOM[21]; 
   unsigned long SwitchID; 
   unsigned long SwitchMask[18]; 
   unsigned long SwitchIMask[18]; 
   unsigned int SwitchIndex[18]; 
   unsigned char Detected[18]; 
   unsigned int FP[18]; 
   unsigned int NUCost[18]; 
   unsigned int NUFP[18]; 
   unsigned int TC; 
   unsigned int AC; 
   unsigned int FPC; 
   float W1; 
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   float W2; 
   float W3; 
   float ACTC; 
   float FPCAC; 
   float FOM; 
   unsigned int npo; 
   unsigned int n; 
   unsigned int found; 
   unsigned int totalsw; 
 
   FILE *costfile; 
   FILE *primaryfile; 
   FILE *secondaryfile; 
 
   printf("Reading cost.csv file..."); 
   /*costfile=fopen("d:\\cost.csv","r");*/ 
   costfile=fopen("./cost.csv","r"); 
   if(costfile==NULL) 
   { 
      printf("\n Error cannot open file cost.csv\a "); 
      exit(0); 
   } 
   /* get all 18 lines */ 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      fgets(CostLine[i],99,costfile); 
   } 
   fclose(costfile); 
   printf("...done.\n"); 
    
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      fp = CostLine[i]; 
      for(j=0; j<18; j++) 
      { 
         Value[j]=strtok(fp,","); 
         fp+=strlen(fp)+1; 
         Cost[i][j]=atoi(Value[j]); 
      } 
   } 
 
   printf("Reading primary.csv file..."); 
   /* primaryfile=fopen("d:\\primary.csv","r"); */ 
   primaryfile=fopen("./primary.csv","r"); 
   if(primaryfile==NULL) 
   { 
      printf("\n Error cannot open file primary.csv\a "); 
      exit(0); 
   } 
   /* get all 18 lines */ 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      fgets(PrimaryLine[i],99,primaryfile); 
   } 
   fclose(primaryfile); 
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   printf("...done.\n"); 
 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      fp = PrimaryLine[i]; 
      for(j=0; j<18; j++) 
      { 
         Value[j]=strtok(fp,","); 
         fp+=strlen(fp)+1; 
         Primary[i][j]=atoi(Value[j]); 
      } 
   } 
 
   printf("Reading secondary.csv file..."); 
   /* secondaryfile=fopen("d:\\secondary.csv","r"); */ 
   secondaryfile=fopen("./secondary.csv","r"); 
   if(secondaryfile==NULL) 
   { 
      printf("\n Error cannot open file secondary.csv\a "); 
      exit(0); 
   } 
   /* get all 18 lines */ 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      fgets(SecondaryLine[i],99,secondaryfile); 
   } 
   fclose(secondaryfile); 
   printf("...done.\n"); 
 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      fp = SecondaryLine[i]; 
      for(j=0; j<18; j++) 
      { 
         Value[j]=strtok(fp,","); 
         fp+=strlen(fp)+1; 
         Secondary[i][j]=atoi(Value[j]); 
      } 
   } 
 
   fprintf(stderr,"Please enter the value for W1: "); 
   p = gets (line); 
   if (p == NULL) 
   { 
      printf("ERROR reading user input for W1!\n"); 
   exit(0); 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    W1 = (float)atof(line); 
   } 
   /* printf("W1 = %5.4f\n",W1); */ 
    
   fprintf(stderr,"Please enter the value for W2: "); 
   p = gets (line); 
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   if (p == NULL) 
   { 
      printf("ERROR reading user input for W2!\n"); 
   exit(0); 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    W2 = (float)atof(line); 
   } 
   /* printf("W2 = %5.4f\n",W2); */ 
    
   fprintf(stderr,"Please enter the value for W3: "); 
   p = gets (line); 
   if (p == NULL) 
   { 
      printf("ERROR reading user input for W3!\n"); 
   exit(0); 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    W3 = (float)atof(line); 
   } 
   printf("\nW1 = %5.4f W2 = %5.4f W3 = %5.4f\n",W1,W2,W3); 
 
   for(i=0; i<10; i++) 
   { 
      Top20Switches[i]=(unsigned long)0; 
      Top20DC[i]=(float)0.0; 
   Top20AC[i]=0; 
      Top20FPC[i]=0; 
      Top20FOM[i]=(float)0.0; 
   } 
    
   /* false positives for given scenarios */ 
   FP[0]=0; 
   FP[1]=0; 
   FP[2]=2; 
   FP[3]=0; 
   FP[4]=0; 
   FP[5]=0; 
   FP[6]=30; 
   FP[7]=28; 
   FP[8]=27; 
   FP[9]=10; 
   FP[10]=0; 
   FP[11]=0; 
   FP[12]=7; 
   FP[13]=0; 
   FP[14]=216; 
   FP[15]=0; 
   FP[16]=0; 
   FP[17]=0; 
    
   /* normal use cost and false positives for 40 hour week */ 
   NUCost[0]=160; 
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   NUCost[1]=0; 
   NUCost[2]=0; 
   NUCost[3]=0; 
   NUCost[4]=480; 
   NUCost[5]=160; 
   NUCost[6]=480; 
   NUCost[7]=160; 
   NUCost[8]=480; 
   NUCost[9]=1120; 
   NUCost[10]=0; 
   NUCost[11]=0; 
   NUCost[12]=160; 
   NUCost[13]=0; 
   NUCost[14]=13760; 
   NUCost[15]=320; 
   NUCost[16]=0; 
   NUCost[17]=0; 
 
   NUFP[0]=0; 
   NUFP[1]=0; 
   NUFP[2]=0; 
   NUFP[3]=0; 
   NUFP[4]=0; 
   NUFP[5]=0; 
   NUFP[6]=320; 
   NUFP[7]=160; 
   NUFP[8]=160; 
   NUFP[9]=1120; 
   NUFP[10]=0; 
   NUFP[11]=0; 
   NUFP[12]=160; 
   NUFP[13]=0; 
   NUFP[14]=6080; 
   NUFP[15]=0; 
   NUFP[16]=0; 
   NUFP[17]=0; 
 
   /* 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      printf("Row %d: ",i); 
      for(j=0; j<18; j++) 
      { 
         printf("%d,",Cost[i][j]); 
      } 
      printf("\n"); 
   } 
    
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      printf("Row %d: ",i); 
      for(j=0; j<18; j++) 
      { 
         printf("%d,",Primary[i][j]); 
      } 
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      printf("\n"); 
   } 
 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      printf("Row %d: ",i); 
      for(j=0; j<18; j++) 
      { 
         printf("%d,",Secondary[i][j]); 
      } 
      printf("\n"); 
   } 
   */ 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      RowSum[i]=0; 
      ColSum[i]=0; 
   } 
   TC=0; 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      for(j=0; j<18; j++) 
      { 
         RowSum[i]+=Cost[i][j]; 
         ColSum[i]+=Cost[j][i]; 
   TC+=Cost[i][j]; 
      } 
   TC+=NUCost[i]; 
   } 
   /* 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      printf("Index: %d RowSum: %d ColSum: 
%d\n",i,RowSum[i],ColSum[i]); 
   } 
   */ 
 
   /* per switch (column) calculations */ 
   printf("\nPer Switch Calculations:\n"); 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      detected=0; 
      sac[i]=0; 
      sfpc[i]=0; 
      for(j=0; j<18; j++) 
      { 
         if(Primary[j][i] > 0) 
   { 
         detected++; 
   } 
         sac[i]+=Cost[j][i]; 
      }   
      sdc[i]=((float)detected)/((float)18); 
      AC=sac[i]+NUCost[i]; 
   FPC=FP[i]+NUFP[i]; 
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   if(AC > 0) 
   { 
         printf("Switch: %2d DC: %5.4f AC: %5d FPC: %5d AC/TC: %5.4f 
FPC/AC: %5.4f\n",i,sdc[i],AC,FPC, 
         (float)AC/(float)TC,(float)FPC/(float)AC); 
      } 
   else 
   { 
         printf("Switch: %2d DC: %5.4f AC: %5d FPC: %5d AC/TC: %5.4f 
FPC/AC: 0.0000\n",i,sdc[i],AC,FPC, 
         (float)AC/(float)TC); 
      } 
   } 
 
   /* initialize switch mask and index */ 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      SwitchMask[i] = 0x00001 << i; 
      SwitchIMask[i] = 0x20000 >> i; 
   SwitchIndex[i] = 17-i;   
   } 
   /* 
   for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
   { 
      printf("Switch: %d Mask: %05lX IMask: %05lX Index: 
%d\n",i,SwitchMask[i],SwitchIMask[i],SwitchIndex[i]); 
   }  
   */ 
   for(i=0; i<20; i++) 
   { 
      Top20Switches[i]=(unsigned long)0; 
      Top20DC[i]=(float)0.0; 
      Top20AC[i]=0; 
      Top20FPC[i]=0; 
      Top20FOM[i]=(float)-100.0; 
   }     
 
   /*for(SwitchID=0; SwitchID<262144; SwitchID++)*/ 
   for(SwitchID=0; SwitchID<262144; SwitchID++) 
   { 
      /* for each unique switch setting */ 
      /* identify all switches that are on */ 
      /* clear detection information */ 
      for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
      { 
         Detected[i]=0; 
      } 
      ac=0; 
      tfpc=0; 
 
      for(i=0; i<18; i++) 
      { 
         /* consider all switches */ 
         if(SwitchIMask[i] & SwitchID) 
   { 
 122 
         /* switch is on, so see what it contributes */ 
            /* switch 0 = column 18 */ 
            /* switch 1 = column 17 */ 
            /* switch 17 = column 1 */ 
         /* printf("SwitchID %05lX has Switch %d 
set\n",SwitchID,i); */ 
            for(j=0; j<18; j++) 
   { 
            /* walk rows j for switch i */ 
               if(Primary[j][i] > 0) 
      { 
              Detected[j]=1; 
      }          
               ac+=Cost[j][i]; 
            } 
   ac+=NUCost[i]; 
            tfpc+=(FP[i]+NUFP[i]); 
         }        
      } 
      detected=0; 
    
      for(i=0;i<18;i++) 
      { 
   fpc[i]=0; 
   /* walk rows */ 
         if(Detected[i]) 
   {   
   /* this row is detected */ 
         detected++; 
    } 
   }   
      dc=((float)detected)/((float)18); 
   ACTC = (float)ac/(float)TC; 
      FPCAC = (float)tfpc/(float)ac; 
   FOM = (W1*dc) - (W2*ACTC) - (W3*FPCAC); 
 
      /* printf("SwitchID:%05lX DC: %4.3f AC: %d FPC: %d TC: %d FOM: 
%8.6f\n",SwitchID,dc,ac,tfpc,TC,FOM);*/ 
 
      found=0; 
      for(i=0; (i<20)&&(!found); i++) 
      { 
         if(FOM > Top20FOM[i]) 
         { 
    /*printf("i: %d SwitchID:%05lX DC: %4.3f AC: %d FPC: %d TC: %d 
FOM: %8.6f is better than\nSwitchID:%05lX DC: %4.3f AC: %d FPC: %d TC: 
%d FOM: 
%8.6f\n",i,SwitchID,dc,ac,tfpc,TC,FOM,Top20Switches[0],Top20DC[0],Top20
AC[0],Top20FPC[0],TC,Top20FOM[0]);*/ 
            for(j=0; j<(20-i); j++) 
     { 
        npo=20-j; 
               n=19-j; 
               Top20Switches[npo]=Top20Switches[n]; 
               Top20DC[npo]=Top20DC[n]; 
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               Top20AC[npo]=Top20AC[n]; 
               Top20FPC[npo]=Top20FPC[n]; 
               Top20FOM[npo]=Top20FOM[n]; 
     } 
            Top20Switches[i]=SwitchID; 
            Top20DC[i]=dc; 
            Top20AC[i]=ac; 
            Top20FPC[i]=tfpc; 
            Top20FOM[i]=FOM; 
            found=1; 
         } 
      } 
      switch(SwitchID) 
   { 
      case 0x28882: 
       printf("\nNIST EC  "); 
    printf("SwitchID:%05lX\nDC: %4.3f AC: %d AC/TC: 
%4.3f FPC: %d FPC/AC: %4.3f TC: %d FOM: %8.6f\n", 
     
SwitchID,dc,ac,(float)ac/(float)TC,tfpc,(float)tfpc/(float)ac,TC,FOM); 
             printf("Switches on: S1 S2 S4 S6 S9\n"); 
    printf("Total Switches On: 5\n\n");  
    break; 
 
      case 0x3CD92: 
       printf("NIST SSLF "); 
    printf("SwitchID:%05lX\nDC: %4.3f AC: %d AC/TC: 
%4.3f FPC: %d FPC/AC: %4.3f TC: %d FOM: %8.6f\n", 
     
SwitchID,dc,ac,(float)ac/(float)TC,tfpc,(float)tfpc/(float)ac,TC,FOM); 
             printf("Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F7 S9\n"); 
    printf("Total Switches On: 10\n\n");  
    break; 
 
      case 0x3CDD3: 
       printf("SNAC      "); 
    printf("SwitchID:%05lX\nDC: %4.3f AC: %d AC/TC: 
%4.3f FPC: %d FPC/AC: %4.3f TC: %d FOM: %8.6f\n", 
     
SwitchID,dc,ac,(float)ac/(float)TC,tfpc,(float)tfpc/(float)ac,TC,FOM); 
             printf("Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F6 F7 S9 
F9\n"); 
    printf("Total Switches On: 12\n\n");  
    break; 
 
      default: 
    break; 
   } 
 
   } 
    
   printf("Top Twenty Switches based upon W1=%f W2=%f 
W3=%f:\n\n",W1,W2,W3);  
   for(i=0; i<20; i++) 
   { 
 124 
      printf("Switch Rank: %2d SwitchID:%05lX\nDC: %4.3f AC: %d AC/TC: 
%4.3f FPC: %d FPC/AC: %4.3f TC: %d FOM: %8.6f\n", 
          i+1,Top20Switches[i],Top20DC[i],Top20AC[i], 
(float)Top20AC[i]/(float)TC,Top20FPC[i],(float)Top20FPC[i]/(float)Top20
AC[i],TC,Top20FOM[i]); 
 
      totalsw=0; 
      printf("Switches on:");  
      for(j=0; j<18; j++) 
   { 
   if(SwitchIMask[j] & Top20Switches[i]) 
   { 
   totalsw++; 
            switch(j) 
   { 
      case 0: 
       printf(" S1"); 
       break; 
 
      case 1: 
       printf(" F1"); 
       break; 
 
      case 2: 
       printf(" S2"); 
       break; 
 
      case 3: 
       printf(" F2"); 
       break; 
 
      case 4: 
       printf(" S3"); 
       break; 
 
      case 5: 
       printf(" F3"); 
       break; 
 
      case 6: 
       printf(" S4"); 
       break; 
 
      case 7: 
       printf(" F4"); 
       break; 
 
      case 8: 
       printf(" S5"); 
       break; 
 
      case 9: 
       printf(" F5"); 
       break; 
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      case 10: 
       printf(" S6"); 
       break; 
 
      case 11: 
       printf(" F6"); 
       break; 
 
      case 12: 
       printf(" S7"); 
       break; 
 
      case 13: 
       printf(" F7"); 
       break; 
 
      case 14: 
       printf(" S8"); 
       break; 
 
      case 15: 
       printf(" F8"); 
       break; 
 
      case 16: 
       printf(" S9"); 
       break; 
 
      case 17: 
       printf(" F9"); 
       break; 
 
               default: 
       printf("Should Not Get Here"); 
       exit(1); 
       break; 
  
   } 
   } 
   } 
      printf("\nTotal Switches On: %d\n\n",totalsw);  
 
 
   } 
   return 0; 
} 
 
 
 
 
 126 
Bibliography 
[1] "FIPS PUB 199, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication; Standards 
for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems," NIST, 
Feb 2004. 
[2] "Federal Information Security Management Act," 2002. 
[3] R. Shirley, "Internet Security Glossary, RFC 2828," 2000. 
[4] "DOD Instruction 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) Implementation," DoD, Ed., 
February 6, 2003. 
[5] U. S. S. S. a. C. C. C. C. M. U. National Threat Assessment Center, "National Threat 
Assessment Center Report," November 2004. 
[6] M. Keeney, E. Kowalski, D. Cappelli, A. Moore, T. Shimeall, and S. Rogers, 
"Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure Sectors," 
United States Secret Service and CERT Program Software Engineering Institute, 
Carnegie Mellon University March 2005. 
[7] L. A. Gordon, M. P. Loeb, W. Lucyshyn, and R. Richardson, "2005 CSI/FBI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey," Computer Security Institute, 2005. 
[8] R. Richardson, "2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey," Computer 
Security Institute, 2003. 
[9] L. A. Gordon, M. P. Loeb, W. Lucyshyn, and R. Richardson, "2004 CSI/FBI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey," Computer Security Institute, 2004. 
[10] R. H. Anderson, "Research and Development Initiatives Focused on Preventing, 
Detecting, and Responding to Insider Misuse of Critical Defense Information 
Systems," in Workshop on Preventing, Detecting, and Responding to Malicious 
Insider Misuse: National Security Research Division, RAND. 
[11] "NSTISSAM INFOSEC /1-99, THE INSIDER THREAT TO U. S. GOVERNMENT  
INFORMATION SYSTEMS," NSTISSC, Ed., 1999. 
[12] U. S. S. S. CSO Magazine, and Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering 
Institute's CERT Coordination Center, "2004 E-Crime Watch Survey,"  2004. 
 127 
[13] S. Ramamoorti, "Internal Auditing: History, Evolution, and Prospects," in The 
Institute of Internal Auditors, 2003. 
[14] R. Reagan, "Farewell Address to the Nation," January 11, 1989. 
[15] "NIST Special Publication 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST 
Handbook," NIST, Ed. 
[16] "COMPUTER SECURITY ACT OF 1987," in Public Law 100-235 (H.R. 145), 
1987. 
[17] G. Stonenurner, A. Goguen, and A. Feringa, "Special Publication 800-30, Risk 
Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, Recommendations of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology," NIST. 
[18] R. C. Brackney and R. H. Anderson, "Understanding the Insider Threat, Proceedings 
of a March 2004 Workshop," 2004. 
[19] "DoJ IG Hanssen Report, A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring, 
Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen," 
Department of Justice August 2003. 
[20] K. Dillard, J. Pfost, and S. Ryan, "The Security Risk Management Guide," Microsoft 
Corporation. 
[21] S. Clark, M. Danseglio, K. Dillard, R. Harrison, J. Maldonado, B. Partridge, and T. 
Quinn, "Windows XP® Security Guide," vol. 2005, Version 2.1 ed: Microsoft 
Corporation. 
[22] P. A. Porras, M. W. Fong, and A. Valdes, "A Mission-Impact-Based Approach to 
INFOSEC Alarm Correlation," SRI International. 
[23] H. Debar and A. Wespi, "Aggregation and Correlation of Intrusion Detection 
Alerts," IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory. 
[24] K. Mandia, C. Prosise, and M. Pepe, Incident Response and Computer Forensics: 
McGraw-Hill, 2003. 
[25] R. Bickel, M. Cook, J. Haney, M. Kerr, U. CT01 T. Parker, and H. Parkes, "Guide to 
Securing Microsoft Windows XP®, Operational Network Evaluations Division of the 
Systems and Network Attack Center (SNAC)," NSA, Ed., Version: 1.1 ed. 
 128 
[26] "How to view and manage event logs in Event Viewer in Windows XP®," in 
Microsoft Technet. 
[27] M. Danseglio, K. Dillard, J. Maldonado, and P. Robichaux, "Threats and 
Countermeasures: Security Settings in Windows® Server 2003 and Windows XP®," 
vol. 2005, Version 2.0 ed: Microsoft Corporation. 
[28] "Windows XP® Professional Resource Kit," in Microsoft Technet. 
[29] A. Steven, "The Security Monitoring and Attack Detection Planning Guide," vol. 
2005: Microsoft Corporation. 
[30] M. Souppaya, K. Kent, and P. M. Johnson, "NIST Special Publication 800-68, 
Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP® Systems for IT Professionals: A 
NIST Security Configuration Checklist, Recommendations of the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology," N. I. o. S. a. Technology, Ed.: U.S. Department of 
Commerce. 
[31] M. W. Sullivan, "NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) SYSTEMS AND 
NETWORK ATTACK CENTER (SNAC) SECURITY GUIDES VERSUS KNOWN 
WORMS," in Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Graduate 
School of Engineering and Management: Air Force Institute of Technology. 
[32] X. Yin, K. Lakkaraju, Y. Li, and W. Yurcik, "Selecting Log Data Sources to 
Correlate Attack Traces for Computer Network Security:  Preliminary Results," 
University of Illinois. 
[33] A. Valdes and K. Skinner, "An Approach to Sensor Correlation," DARPA. 
[34] A. Valdes and K. Skinner, "Probablistic Alert Correlation," DARPA. 
[35] P. Ning and D. Xu, "Adapting Query Optimization Techniques for Efficient 
Intrusion Alert Correlation," North Carolina State University. 
[36] C. Kruegel, T. Toth, and C. Kerer, "Decentralized Event Correlation for Intrusion 
Detection," Distributed Systems Group, Technical University of Vienna 2002. 
[37] R. Jain, The Art of Computer Systems Performance Analysis:  Techniques for 
Experimental Design, Measurement, Simulation, and Modeling: John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc., 1991. 
 129 
[38] A. G. Anderson, From Set Through Function: Elementary Mathematics for the 
Nonspecialist: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1972. 
[39] K. Holsinger, "Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Statistical Decision Theory" 
University of Connecticut, 2005 
  
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other 
aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
13-06-2006 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis  
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
Aug. 2005 – Jun. 2006 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
Development of a Methodology for Customizing Insider Threat Auditing 
On A Microsoft Windows XP® Operating System 
 5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Levoy, Terry E., Gunnery Sergeant, USMC 
 
 
 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 
 WPAFB OH 45433-8865 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT/GIA/ENG/06-07 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
 
S
9
F 
4 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
       
        Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. 
 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
 
 
14. ABSTRACT  
 Most organizations are aware that threats from trusted insiders pose a great risk to their organization and are very 
difficult to protect against.  Auditing is recognized as an effective technique to detect malicious insider activities.  
However, current auditing methods are typically applied with a one-size-fits-all approach and may not be an 
appropriate mitigation strategy, especially towards insider threats. 
This research develops a 4-step methodology for designing a customized auditing template for a Microsoft Windows 
XP® operating system.  Two tailoring methods are presented which evaluate both by category and and by 
configuration.  Also developed are various metrics and weighting factors as a mechanism to evaluate auditing 
effectiveness for the purpose of optimizing the template according to organizational security requirements.  Various 
industry standard auditing templates are evaluated against a custom designed template.  Results indicate that a 
customized auditing template tailored for an insider threat scenario is more effective at detecting insider malicious 
activities. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
     insider threat, auditing, auditing template, security template 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dr. Robert F. Mills(ENG) Robert.Mills@afit.edu 
a. 
REPORT 
 
U 
b. 
ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
 
U 
17. LIMITATION 
OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
 
UU 
18. 
NUMBER  
      OF 
      PAGES 
 
81 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-6565, ext 4527 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
  
 
